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PROCEDURAL RULEMAKING UNDER THE JUDICIAL
COUNCILS REFORM AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
DISABILITY ACT OF 1980
STEPHEN B. BURBANKt
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of enacting legislation to supplement the constitutional
provisions for impeachment and removal of federal judges has long in-
trigued those discontent with the inefficiency of the constitutional ar-
rangements. For years, congressional bills that included removal as a
sanction for judicial misconduct foundered on opposition asserting that,
to safeguard judicial independence, the framers had intended the consti-
tutional arrangements to be exclusive. During the 1970's, when calls
for public accountability of government officials respected no separation
of powers, the idea's time had come. The Senate, where judicial disci-
pline legislation had been reborn and nourished by a series of events
© Copyright 1982 by Stephen B. Burbank.
t Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1968,
J.D. 1973, Harvard University.
Marc Rossell, LL.M. 1982, provided excellent research assistance.
This article was stimulated by my service as a co-reporter of rules to implement the Act in
the Third Circuit. I wish to thank Chief Judge Collins Seitz for giving me an opportunity to work
in this area, and my co-reporter, Daniel Segal, for his comments and suggestions on a draft of this
Article. I am also indebted to Arlin Adams, Geoffrey Hazard, Leo Levin, Louis Pollak, Michael
Remington, Maurice Rosenberg, Louis Schwartz, Murray Schwartz, Norma Shapiro, Stephen
Subrin, and Alan Watson. William Weller and his staff in the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts were generous with their time and the resources of the office.
(283)
284 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:283
suggesting the inadequacy of judicial self-regulation, took the lead.
Legislative proposals were refined, with the proponents of Senate bills
monitoring the constitutional climate and the federal judiciary attempt-
ing to respond while weakened by division in the ranks. Fortunately for
the judges, their leaders realized the precariousness of their position in
time to grasp a helping hand offered by the House.
The memorable battles in this campaign were not fought over
matters of procedure. Both in the Congress and in the literature, atten-
tion focused for many years on basic constitutional issues concerning
the separation of powers and judicial independence. The position of the
federal judiciary on these issues was not always clear even when legis-
lative proposals included that most controversial provision, the power to
remove. Eventually Congress agreed to drop removal as a sanction and
accepted, not without considerable skepticism, the claims that the fed-
eral judiciary should in most cases take care of its own and that it could
do so within existing institutions. In the process, residual arguments of
unconstitutionality, lack of need, and unwise policy were overwhelmed
by calls for public accountability and for clarification of the powers that
be.
The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disabil-
ity Act of 19801 reposes primary authority to resolve complaints of ju-
dicial misconduct and disability in the judicial councils of the circuits,
entities composed of federal judges that were established by Congress in
1939 as part of a more comprehensive program to improve the adminis-
tration of the business of the federal courts. The Act provides for the
' Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (effective Oct. 1, 1981). The Act's disciplinary
procedures are contained id. § 3, 94 Stat. 2035, 2036-40 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (Supp. V
1981)).
The Act is compromise legislation. A Senate bill, S. 1873, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), was
passed on October 30, 1979. See 125 CONG. REC. 30,100-02 (1979). It dealt only with judicial
conduct and disability. But pursuant to agreement, S. 1873 was added as an amendment to
S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which included provisions for council reform and which, as
so amended, was considered as having been read for a third time and passed. See 125 CONG. REC.
23,242-43 (1979); id. at 30,102.
The House alternative, H.R. 7974, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H8784 (daily ed.
Sept. 15, 1980), was passed on September 15, 1980. See 126 CONG. REC. H8788 (daily ed. Sept.
15, 1980). It included provisions on both council reform and judicial conduct and disability.
Thereafter, the House passed a bill that combined the enacting clause of S. 1873 and the remain-
ing provisions of H.R. 7974. See id. at H8789-90. The Senate passed a "compromise substitute
amendment," id. at 813,858 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); see id. at
S13,866, and the House concurred in the Senate amendment, see id. at H10,188-92 (daily ed. Oct.
1, 1980).
The Act's background and legislative history are reviewed more fully infra text accompanying
notes 24-106. Some understanding of these technical points may, however, be necessary in order to
avoid misunderstanding and inaccuracy. See Culver & Cruikshanks, Judicial Discipline at the
Federal Level: A New Response to an Old Problem, in THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 107
(P. Dubois ed. 1982).
* The judicial councils of the circuits were created by the Administrative Office Act of 1939,
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restructuring of the councils to include district judge representation'
and sets forth in considerable detail the process to be followed in resolv-
ing complaints. The first step in that process is filing a complaint with
the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit.4 The chief judge of the
circuit reviews the complaint, which he may dismiss if it does not meet
statutory requirements, directly relates to the merits of a decision or
procedural ruling, or is frivolous. The chief judge is also authorized "to
conclude the proceeding if he finds that appropriate corrective action
has been taken." 5 Failing dismissal of the complaint or conclusion of
ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223. Prior to 1981, the councils' powers derived from language that, as revised
in 1948, codified, and amended, provided that "[e]ach judicial council shall make all necessary
orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its
circuit. The district judges and bankruptcy judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of the
judicial council." 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (Supp. III 1979) (amended 1980). For the history of the
judicial councils within the administrative organization of the federal courts, see P. FISH, THE
POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 125-65, 379-426 (1973); Fish, The Circuit
Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1970).
3 See Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 2, 94 Stat. 2035, 2035-36 (1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 332
(1976)). This article is not concerned with that aspect of the Act, which is discussed in Remington,
Circuit Council Reform: A Boat Hook for Judges and Court Administrators 1981 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 695.
Section 2, providing for district judge representation on the councils, was adopted
primarily because Section 3 vests the councils with a primary role in the processing
of complaints against judges and magistrates. The district judges insisted that they
be represented on the councils if the councils were to exercise such sensitive
authority.
Browning, Evaluating Judicial Performance and Related Matters, 90 F.R.D. 197, 201 (1981).
For the Act's ambiguities with respect to structural questions, see generally Neisser, The
New Federal Judicial Discipline Act: Some Questions Congress Didn't Answer, 65 JUDICATURE
143, 147-51 (1981).
' (c)(1) Any person alleging that a circuit, district, or bankruptcy judge, or a magis-
trate, has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administra-
tion of the business of the courts, or alleging that such a judge or magistrate is
unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability,
may file with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint
containing a brief statement of the facts constituting such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
(c)(2) Upon receipt of a complaint filed under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the
clerk shall promptly transmit such complaint to the chief judge of the circuit, or, if
the conduct complained of is that of the chief judge, to that circuit judge in regular
active service next senior in date of commission (hereafter, for purposes of this sub-
section only, included in the term "chief judge"). The clerk shall simultaneously
transmit a copy of the complaint to the judge or magistrate whose conduct is the
subject of the complaint.
(c)(3) After expeditiously reviewing a complaint, the chief judge, by written order
stating his reasons, may -
(A) dismiss the complaint, if he finds it to be (i) not in conformity with
paragraph (1) of this subsection, (ii) directly related to the merits of a deci-
sion or procedural ruling, or (iii) frivolous; or
(B) conclude the proceeding if he finds that appropriate corrective action has
been taken.
The chief judge shall transmit copies of his written order to the complainant and to
the judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject of the complaint.
28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c)(2)-(3) (Supp. V 1981).
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the proceeding, the chief judge must appoint a special committee, con-
sisting of the chief judge and equal numbers of circuit and district
judges, to investigate the complaint and file with the council a report
containing its findings and recommendations.' The council, which is
authorized to conduct any additional investigation it considers neces-
sary, is directed to take such action "as is appropriate to assure the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts
within the circuit, including, but not limited to," actions specifically
enumerated in the Act.7
6 (c)(4) If the chief judge does not enter an order under paragraph (3) of this subsec-
tion, such judge shall promptly -
(A) appoint himself and equal numbers of circuit and district judges of the
circuit to a special committee to investigate the facts and allegations con-
tained in the complaint;
(B) certify the complaint and any other documents pertaining thereto to each
member of such committee; and
(C) provide written notice to the complainant and the judge or magistrate
whose conduct is the subject of the complaint of the action taken under this
paragraph.
(c)(5) Each committee appointed under paragraph (4) of this subsection shall con-
duct an investigation as extensive as it considers necessary, and shall expeditiously
file a comprehensive written report thereon with the judicial council of the circuit.
Such report shall present both the findings of the investigation and the committees
recommendations for necessary and appropriate action by the judicial council of the
circuit.
28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c)(4)-(5) (Supp. V 1981).
7 (c)6) Upon receipt of a report filed under paragraph (5) of this subsection, the
judicial council -
(A) may conduct any additional investigation which it considers to be
necessary;
(B) shall take such action as is appropriate to assure the effective and expe-
ditious administration of the business of the courts within the circuit, includ-
ing, but not limited to, any of the following actions:
(i) directing the chief judge of the district of the magistrate whose
conduct is the subject of the complaint to take such action as the
judicial council considers appropriate;
(ii) certifying disability of a judge appointed to hold office during
good behavior whose conduct is the subject of the complaint, pursu-
ant to the procedures and standards provided under subsection (b) of
this section;
(iii) requesting that any such judge appointed to hold office during
good behavior voluntarily retire, with the provision that the length of
service requirements under section 371 of this title shall not apply;
(iv) ordering that, on a temporary basis for a time certain, no further
cases be assigned to any judge or magistrate whose conduct is the
subject of a complaint;
(v) censuring or reprimanding such judge or magistrate by means of
private communication;
(vi) censuring or reprimanding such judge or magistrate by means of
public announcement; or
(vii) ordering such other action as it considers appropriate under the
circumstances, except that (I) in no circumstances may the council
order removal from office of any judge appointed to hold office dur-
ing good behavior, and (II) any removal of a magistrate shall be in
accordance with section 631 of this title and any removal of a bank-
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In addition, the Act authorizes petitions for review by the com-
plainant or the subject of a complaint to the council from the action of a
chief judge in dismissing a complaint or concluding the proceeding, and
to the Judicial Conference of the United States8 from the action of a
judicial council upon receipt of a report from a special committee.9 Fi-
nally, the Act specifies a number of procedural details, primarily notice
requirements,10 and, although conferring on the councils rulemaking
authority to implement the statutory process, requires that certain pro-
visions be contained in any rules that are promulgated.1"
Thus, although leaving most matters of judicial misconduct and
ruptcy judge shall be in accordance with section 153 of this tide; and
(C) shall immediately provide written notice to the complainant and to such
judge or magistrate of the action taken under this paragraph.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6) (Supp. V 1981).
6 For the history of the Judicial Conference within the administrative organization of the
federal courts, see P. FISH, supra note 2, at 228-68. The Conferences general powers and respon-
sibilities are set forth in 28 U.S.C, § 331 (Supp. V 1981). In addition to its role in entertaining
petitions for review of council action under the Act, see infra note 9, the Conference is empowered
to modify any council rule and itself to prescribe rules. See infra note 11.
(c)(10) A complainant, judge, or magistrate aggrieved by a final order of the chief
judge under paragraph (3) of this subsection may petition the judicial council for
review thereof. A complainant, judge, or magistrate aggrieved by an action of the
judicial council under paragraph (6) of this subsection may petition the Judicial
Conference of the United States for review thereof. The Judicial Conference, or the
standing committee established under section 331 of this title, may grant a petition
filed by a complainant, judge, or magistrate under this paragraph. Except as ex-
pressly provided in this paragraph, all orders and determinations, including denials
of petitions for review, shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially re-
viewable on appeal or otherwise.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (Supp. V 1981).
10 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 5; id. § 372 (c)(4),
quoted supra note 6.
11 (c)(11) Each judicial council and the Judicial Conference may prescribe such rules
for the conduct of proceedings under this subsection, including the processing of
petitions for review, as each considers to be appropriate. Such rules shall contain
provisions requiring that -
(A) adequate prior notice of any investigation be given in writing to the
judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject of the complaint;
(B) the judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject of the complaint be
afforded an opportunity to appear (in person or by counsel) at proceedings
conducted by the investigating panel, to present oral and documentary evi-
dence, to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents,
to cross-examine witnesses, and to present argument orally or in writing;
and
(C) the complainant be afforded an opportunity to appear at proceedings
conducted by the investigating panel, if the panel concludes that the com-
plainant could offer substantial information.
Any rule promulgated under this subsection shall be a matter of public record, and
any such rule promulgated by a judicial council may be modified by the Judicial
Conference.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11) (Supp. V 1981).
Under § 4 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. V 1981), the Judicial Conference of the
United States "may also prescribe and modify rules for the exercise of the authority provided in
section 372(c) of this title." For further discussion, see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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disability to the federal judiciary itself, the Act is not without direction.
Most of it, however, is procedural. 2 The major substantive question
presented by judicial discipline legislation - the types of conduct sub-
ject to disciplinary action - remains in large part unanswered."
It is appropriate now, more than two years after the statute was
enacted and one year after its effective date, to assess the capacity of the
Act, as implemented by the judiciary, to fulfill the purposes for which it
was designed. Congress sought to establish a mechanism that would
enable the federal judiciary to deal authoritatively, fairly, and effi-
ciently with misconduct and disability complaints against federal judges
and magistrates, with the goals of improving judicial ethics and judicial
accountability to the public while preserving the essentials of judicial
independence.14
Of course, it is too early for a comprehensive assessment of self-
regulation under the Act. That can come only when more complaints
have been resolved and when that experience is available for analysis.
The decentralized system that the judiciary has put in place is, how-
ever, of immediate interest. For reported experience under the Act to
date suggests that it may be a long time before enough complaints have
tested the councils' procedures, other than procedures for dismissal, to
permit a useful evaluation in practice." When confronted with a simi-
lar situation before the Act was passed, Congress was unwilling to stay
its hand, and the Act's legislative history suggests that "vigorous over-
sight" by Congress may result in amendments less deferential to the
principles of judicial independence and decentralized judicial adminis-
tration. 6 If the councils' implementation of the Act is found wanting,
" See supra text accompanying notes 5-11. The statutory process is schematically repre-
sented in a chart distributed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which is
reprinted in Re, Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Judicial Councils Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 8 N. KY. L. REV. 221, 258 (1981).
"' The Act's standards of both misconduct and disability are contained in the provision au-
thorizing the filing of a complaint. See supra note 4.
14 The purpose of the proposed legislation is to create a mechanism and procedures
within the judicial branch of government to consider and respond to complaints
against Federal judges. A secondary purpose of the legislation is to revise the com-
position of the judicial councils of the Federal judicial circuits, and to clarify the
authority of both the circuit councils and the Judicial Conference of the United
States in the area of judicial discipline and disability. The goals of the proposed
legislation are to improve judicial accountability and ethics, to promote respect for
the principle that the appearance of justice is an integral element of this country's
justice system, and, at the same time, to maintain the independence and autonomy
of the judicial branch of government.
H.R. REP. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
This Article is not concerned with the Act's "secondary purpose . . . to revise the composi-
tion of the judicial councils of the Federal judicial circuits." Id.; see supra note 3.
's See infra text accompanying notes 164-65; notes 257 & 276; Appendix B.
16 See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. H8788 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (statement of Rep. Butler); id.
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Congress may not permit the judiciary to clean its own house again.
Moreover, although the judicial councils of the circuits are authorized
to promulgate rules for the conduct of proceedings, the Judicial Confer-
ence is empowered to modify any council rule so promulgated as well
as to prescribe rules. 17 If the need is there, the judiciary has the means
to act now, before Congress reacts.
Eleven circuit councils have promulgated revised rules to imple-
ment the Act, which became effective October 1, 1981; the Judicial
Council of the Tenth Circuit continues to use rules that were first
adopted in November, 1978.18 An analysis of post-Act rules raises
questions about the potential of decentralized implementation efforts to
serve Congress's purposes and to achieve Congress's goals.
First, most of the sets of rules promulgated by the judicial councils
of the circuits do little more than track the provisions of the Act."9
They leave important matters undefined, including the procedure that
will be followed by special committees and the councils in investigating
and resolving complaints and by the councils in handling petitions for
review. Although there are reasons, including some good reasons, that
at S13,858, S13,861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at H10,191
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14,
at 20; id. at 31 (supplemental views of Hon. M. Caldwell Butler); Re, supra note 12, at 255-56;
Remington, supra note 3, at 731; infra note 106.
For Congress's refusal to defer legislation pending the accumulation of experience under the
councils' post-March 1979 rules, which were severely criticized, see infra text accompanying notes
58-65; note 276.
Decentralization is, of course, a relative concept. As a result of the 1939 Act, see supra note
2, federal judicial administration is decentralized in comparison with an alternative system that
would have reposed significant administrative responsibilities in the Supreme Court. See P. FISH,
supra note 2, at 125-65. It is not decentralized in comparison with the regime of individual court
autonomy that had previously obtained. See id. at 3-14. For the view that "[tihe extent of actual
decentralization has been minimal," see J. MCDERMOTT & S. FLANDERS, THE IMPACT OF THE
CIRCUIT EXECUTIvE ACT 193-94 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MCDERMOTT & FLANDERS].
17 See supra note 11.
IS The rules of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Councils, as amended through
February 1, 1982, are included in the cumulative annual pocket part of 28 U.S.C.A. Rules. The
rules of the Third Circuit Council are published in 688 F.2d No. 3 (Nov. 1, 1982) (yellow pages).
The rules of the Eleventh Circuit Council are published in 694 F.2d No. 3 (Jan. 24, 1983)
(yellow pages) (addendum three). Copies of all of the councils' rules are on file with the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review. All councils except that of the Eleventh Circuit, which did not
exist prior to the Act's effective date, had preexisting rules on the subject.
19 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(17) (Supp. V 1981) requires the Court of Claims, the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals, and the Customs Court to "prescribe rules, consistent with the foregoing
provisions of this subsection, establishing procedures for the filing of complaints with respect to the
conduct of any judge of such court and for the investigation and resolution of such complaints." By
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 112(c), 96 Stat. 25, 29, this
section was amended "by striking out 'Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
and the Customs Court' and inserting in lieu thereof 'United States Claims Court, the Court of
International Trade, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.'"
Although this Article does not discuss the rules promulgated by the specialized courts, they
are included in the analytical table, infra Appendix A. As quickly appears, the tendency to track
the Act is particularly striking in these sets of rules.
19821
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can be adduced to explain this phenomenon, it is doubtful that they
justify the degree of minimalism that marks council rulemaking under
the Act. The councils' choice not to elaborate statutory process and pro-
cedure has impeded experimentation, the putative benefits of which
furnished the primary argument against uniform rules. It entails uncer-
tainty and unpredictability and thus disserves Congress's goals of en-
suring public accountability and preserving judicial independence. Fi-
nally, the councils' choice of rulemaking minimalism raises questions
regarding the efficiency of the implementation efforts.20
Second, the rules of the various councils, insofar as they depart
from the statutory skeleton, are not uniform in a number of provisions.
This was to be expected - indeed to be hoped for - in the initial
rulemaking, and Congress, in the grant of rulemaking authority to the
Judicial Conference, has provided a means for its correction. Dis-
uniformity in some aspects is of no concern. In others, it invites claims
of unequal treatment that are unlikely to be satisfied by a defense of
local experimentation. As a result of the councils' approach to rulemak-
ing, however, the Judicial Conference does not know what procedures
will be used on many questions in most circuits. The possibility of in-
tercircuit conflict in procedure.is, therefore, a more serious problem for
the Conference than the existence of conflict.21
Third, some of the rules promulgated by the councils are inconsis-
tent with the Act's specific procedural directives, animating policies, or
grant of rulemaking authority. 
2
Fourth, if one views public accountability as a discrete congres-
sional goal, both the rulemaking and the reporting under the Act to
date are causes for concern. Neither the processes used to develop the
councils' rules nor the efforts to make those rules known to the public
suggest that the federal judiciary has embraced this goal. The methods
presently used to report on the operation of the system established by
Congress are such that, even when there has been more experience, a
comprehensive assessment will be difficult if not impossible - another
reason to evaluate now the system established by council rules.23
The federal judiciary has the means to make the Act serve, and be
perceived to serve, Congress's purposes and goals. The Judicial Confer-
ence should use its powers under the Act to eliminate unwarranted dis-
uniformity and rules that are inconsistent with the Act's provisions or
its policies. If, as may be the case, continued exclusive reliance on local
2 See infra text accompanying notes 107-79.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 180-96.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 197-242.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 243-70.
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rulemaking by the councils is inappropriate, the Conference should also
use its powers to fashion model rules that better serve those policies,
affording the councils choice among alternatives where continuing ex-
perimentation is warranted. The federal judiciary should cooperate in
identifying and furnishing information that, without sacrificing legiti-
mate interests in confidentiality, will assist Congress and the public in
determining whether the purposes and goals of the Act are in fact being
well served. The history of the Act suggests that if the judiciary does
not address these problems, Congress will.
II. THE ACT'S HISTORY
A brief review of the Act's background and legislative history not
only informs our understanding of Congress's choices. It also provides a
basis for evaluating the decentralized system of self-regulation created
by the federal judiciary to implement the Act, the methods by which
that system was created, and the adequacy of the information available
for its evaluation in practice. Finally, such a review helps explain the
course the councils have chosen and the considerations that should or
will influence the Judicial Conference and Congress in responding to
those efforts.
A. Background
1. The Senate Proposes and the Judicial Conference Responds
a. The Tydings Bills
A number of developments prompted Senator Tydings to revive
judicial discipline legislation in the mid-1960's.24 The effectiveness of
24 See 111 CONG. REC. 27,105 (1965) (statement of Sen. Tydings); see also Tydings, The
Congress and the Courts: Helping the Judiciary to Help Itself, 52 A.B.A. J. 321 (1966).
Tydings's bills found their antecedents in bills introduced in the 1930's and 1940's. For ac-
counts of this history, see AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND TENURE
PROPOSALS 3-4 (1979), reprinted in Judicial Tenure and Discipline 1979-80: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 511-12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings];
Holloman, The Judicial Reform Act: History, Analysis, and Comment, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 128, 131-33 (1970); Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some
Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 687-93 (1969), reprinted in Hearings on S. 295,
S. 522, S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Judicial Machinery and Constitution of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 408-14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hear-
ings]; Wallace, Must We Have the Nunn Bill? The Alternative of Judicial Councils of the Cir-
cuits, 51 IND. LJ. 297, 302-03 (1976), reprinted in House Hearings, supra, at 332-33. Some of
the relevant earlier history is reviewed in Kurland, supra, at 670-87.
It is enough for present purposes to note that the only sanction the early bills provided was
removal, thus rendering them vulnerable, notwithstanding then-recent scholarship, to claims of
unconstitutionality. See Shartel, Federal Judges - Appointment, Supervision, and Removal -
19821
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the judicial councils in dealing even with matters of judicial administra-
tion unquestionably within their purview had been challenged.25 In ad-
dition, there was evidence that the problem of the misbehaving or dis-
abled federal judge was more serious than previously recognized and
that impeachment was an inadequate mechanism for addressing it.26
Finally, starting in 1960, the states had developed mechanisms to ad-
dress the problem that seemed to be effective.27 But Senator Tydings's
bills, which were heavily influenced by state models,2 foundered on by
then familiar ground - the argument that the Constitution provides
the exclusive means to remove federal judges - protected by Senator
Ervin, a formidable guardian."
b. The Nunn/DeConcini Bill
In 1974, when Senator Nunn took charge of the effort, Watergate
was on everybody's mind. 0 Moreover, the ranks of those who believed
that the constitutional obstacles to legislation authorizing the removal of
an article III judge were surmountable had grown," and their case was
Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 723, 870 (1930). But see Otis,
A Proposed Tribunal: Is it Constitutional?, 7 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 1 (1938).
25 See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FIELD
STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 3, 32, 34-44, 79-84b (Comm. Print
1959); A REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOc. No. 201,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. v-vi (1961); Burger, The Courts on Trial, 22 F.R.D. 71, 77, 82 (1958);
Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils in the Administration of the Courts, 47
A.B.A. J. 169, 170 (1961).
26 See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 27,108 (1965) (statement of Sen. Tydings); Holloman, supra
note 24, at 133; Tydings, supra note 24, at 322.
' See I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2d ed. 1980) [herein-
after cited as TESITOR & SINKS]; Tydings, supra note 24, at 324. By 1980, 49 states and the
District of Columbia had adopted "disciplinary systems other than the traditional but seldom used
methods of impeachment, address, and concurrent resolution." TESITOR & SINKS, supra, at v.
For the effect of judicial and political developments on Senator Tydings's proposals during
the time they were being formulated and considered, see Holloman, supra note 24, at 134-44; see
also Tydings, supra note 24, at 322-23. Senator Tydings himself later provided an account of the
history of his efforts and of the opposition he encountered. See Judicial Tenure Act: Hearing on
S. 1423 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-62 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on S. 1423] (state-
ment of Mr. Tydings).
U See Hearing on S. 1423, supra note 27, at 62, 78, 93 (statement of Mr. Tydings).
19 See Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
108, 121-27 (1970); see also Holloman, supra note 24, at 135-36, 142-44. In his testimony on
S. 1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), Tydings noted Ervin's opposition, Hearing on S. 1423,
supra note 27, at 81, but seemed preoccupied by that of Judge Richard Chambers. See id. at 77,
81.
30 Nunn introduced his first bill on the subject, S. 4153, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), in
October 1974. Hearing on S. 1423, supra note 27, at 33 (statement of Sen. Nunn). For the influ-
ence of Watergate, see id. at 31; see also House Hearings, supra note 24, at 131 (statement of
Rep. Rodino). For other suggested influences, see R. WHEELER & A. LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
AND REMOVAL IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (1979) [hereinafter cited as WHEELER & LEVIN], re-
printed in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 663.
3, See, e.g., R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS ch. 4 (1973).
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not hurt by the Judicial Conference's responses to Nunn's proposals."2
In March 1978 the Conference considered S. 1423, a bill co-sponsored
by Senators Nunn and DeConcini that included removal, a Judicial
Conduct and Disability Commission, and a Court on Judicial Conduct
and Disability; the Conference's approval in principle of that bill, al-
though accompanied by a constitutional caveat about removal and a few
suggested amendments, was "widely misunderstood." 3 By the time the
Conference had clarified its position in September 1978, the Nunn/
DeConcini bill had passed in the Senate." S. 1423 was not acted on in
the House in the Ninety-Fifth Congress, however.
The Senate's action on the Nunn/DeConcini bill made it clear to
the Judicial Conference that it would need to play a more active and
assertive role in the legislative process. Many believed that the prospect
of a central investigative bureaucracy, a special court, and adversary
proceedings, as called for by the Nunn/DeConcini bill, was the pros-
pect of harassment. 5 Moreover, like its predecessors, the Nunn/
DeConcini bill departed from the philosophy of decentralized judicial
administration that had prevailed since the legislation establishing the
The Conference had approved judicial discipline legislation "in principle" for many years.
See House Hearings, supra note 24, at 60-61 (statement of Judge Elmo B. Hunter). Although
such expressions of approval were accompanied by caveats about the constitutionality of removal
provisions in the bills, in 1969 a committee of the Conference recommended approval of Senator
Tydings's bill, S. 1506, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), that included removal. Report of the Pro-
ceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 53 (Oct. 1969). The matter was referred
back to the committee. Id. Moreover, in its 1975 comments on Nunn's bill, S. 4153, supra note
30, the Conference suggested that "a judge. . . may be mandatorily (or involuntarily) retired [as
opposed to removed] for serious misconduct and he may be relieved of any further judicial duties."
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 5 (Mar. 1975).
" S. 1423, supra note 29. Following the Conference's action on S. 1423, see Report of the
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 6-7 (Mar. 1978), the Chief Justice
stated: "There will be some legislation. In general, the approach of Senator Nunn, and now, of
Senator DeConcini, has been found acceptable by the Judicial Conference of the United States. I
think that it will prove to be a very useful device." Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 81 F.R.D. 263, 278 (1978).
In these circumstances, it is understandable that the Conference's position on S. 1423 was
"widely misunderstood" and that the Conference felt the need to make dear its "disapproval of
any legislative provision which purports to delegate to any other tribunal or entity the constitu-
tional power of Congress to remove a federal judge from office." Report of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States 50 (Sept. 1978); see also House Hearings, supra note 24,
at 61, 63-64 (statement of Judge Hunter); id. at 92-93 (statement of Judge Hunter).
' S. 1423, as amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee and on the floor, passed in the
Senate on September 7, 1978. See 124 CONG. REC. 28,321 (1978). The Conference's response to
widespread misunderstanding of its March 1978 comments on S. 1423 was made at its meeting on
September 21-22. See supra note 33.
" See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 28-29 (statement of Judge Hunter); House
Hearings, supra note 24, at 65-66 (statement of Judge Hunter); Wallace, The Nunn Bill: An
Unneeded Compromise of Judicial Independence, 61 JUDICATURE 476 (1978), reprinted in House
Hearings, supra note 24, at 357. Senator Nunn introduced S. 295, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
upon which Judge Hunter was commenting, on January 31, 1979. It was identical to S. 1423 as
passed by the Senate in September 1978. 125 CONG. REC. 1449 (1979) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
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judicial councils of the circuits in 1939.16 Enactment of the bill would
have constituted a rejection of the claims of the organized federal judici-
ary that it was capable of self-regulation within the existing structure.
87
At the same time, some judges resisted those claims of existing power,38
and other critics doubted the councils' willingness to exercise it. 9 These
attacks on the status quo tended to disarm those who argued that there
was - and to make pragmatists of those who wished that there were
- no need for additional legislation clarifying the councils' powers. A
study by the Conference's Committee on Court Administration, re-
quested in September 1978, resulted in proposed legislation.40
3s See sources cited supra note 35; supra note 2; WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 28-
36. For the possibility that the word "rhetoric" should be substituted for "philosophy," see supra
note 16.
"' As noted by Senator Nunn, "[tihe legislative history of Section 332(d) is somewhat ambig-
uous and has been cited as authority by parties on both sides of the discipline issue." Nunn,
Judicial Tenure, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29, 34 (1977). Whatever may have been the originally
intended limits on the authority of the councils to deal formally with problems of judicial miscon-
duct or disability, the Conference and some councils had become progressively more expansive in
asserting that authority. See, e.g., P. FISH, supra note 2, at 400-04, 417-26; Wallace, supra note
24, at 311-23. In 1961, the Conference approved a report on the responsibilities and powers of the
judicial councils. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 51-53
(Mar. 1961). One of the Conference's conclusions is of particular interest:
(2) The responsibility of the Councils "for the effective and expeditious administra-
tion of the business of the courts within its circuit" extends not merely to the busi-
ness of the courts in its technical sense (Judicial administration), such as the han-
dling and dispatching of cases, but also to the business of the judiciary in its
institutional sense (administration of justice), such as the avoiding of any stigma,
disrepute, or other element of loss of public esteem and confidence in respect to the
court system, from the actions of a judge or other person attached to the courts.
Id. at 51 (emphasis added), reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1961).
The Conference reasserted this proposition in a statement entitled "Powers, Functions and
Duties of Circuit Councils" approved in 1974. See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 8 (Mar. 1974).
With respect to disability as opposed to misconduct, 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (Supp. V 1981) had
for many years provided a means calculated to persuade a reluctant judge to retire. It was rarely
invoked, however. See WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 34; Kaufman, Chilling Judicial
Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 708-09 (1979), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at
314-15, and House Hearings, supra note 24, at 576-77; Tydings, supra note 24, at 324.
" See, e.g., Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 129 (1970)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); 398 U.S. at 141 (Black, J., dissenting); Battisti, An Independent Judici-
ay or an Evanescent Dream, 25 CASE W. RFS. L. REV. 711 (1975); see also Comment, The
Authority of the Circuit Judicial Councils: Separation of Powers in the Courts of Appeals, 5
SETON HALL L. REV. 815 (1974).
' See, e.g., P. FISH, supra note 2, at 404-09; Hearing on S. 1423, supra note 27, at 79
(statement of Mr. Tydings). These doubts persisted. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at
7. Certainly, the public record of the councils' efforts hardly inspired confidence. See, e.g., Tyd-
ings, supra note 24, at 322-23; Comment, supra note 38. For an argument that this is not a fair
basis of evaluation given the councils' preference for informal techniques, see S. FLANDERS & J.
McDERMOTr, OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL COUNCILS 26-35 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as FLANDERS & MCDERMOTr]; WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 49-59. For the influence of
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970), on councils' willingness to
proceed formally, see WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 38.
40 In addition to clarifying its position on removal at the September 1978 meeting, see supra
note 32, the Conference directed "its Committee on Court Administration to conduct a study to
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c. Alternatives to the Nunn/DeConcini Bill
The Senate's action on S. 1423 also stimulated further activity in
Congress. In the Senate, alternatives to the Nunn/DeConcini bill"1
were introduced early in 1979 by Senators Bayh42 and Kennedy.'
These alternatives differed in important respects. But they both rejected
removal by means other than those constitutionally prescribed and built
on the premise that, except in cases where impeachment might be war-
ranted, complaints alleging judicial misconduct or disability should be
resolved by the judiciary acting through existing mechanisms. "
Within weeks after the Bayh and Kennedy bills were introduced,
the Judicial Conference considered proposed amendments to 28 U.S.C.
§ 332,"5 the statutory provision from which the councils derived their
determine whether legislation is necessary to clarify the power of the judicial councils of the cir-
cuits to adopt procedures for the examination of judicial conduct in cases where it is warranted
and to take appropriate action with respect to such instances." Report of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States 50 (Sept. 1978). As authoritatively reported, "[t]he pur-
pose of this second resolution [was] obviously to recommend proposals which might be necessary to
set up procedures which would make it possible for the Judicial Branch to deal with judicial
misbehavior through revisions of existing administrative machinery." Judicial Conference Calls
for Changes in Judicial Tenure Bill, THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1978, at 2. For the Committee's pro-
posed legislation, see Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 24 (statement of Judge Hunter); House
Hearings, supra note 24, at 61-62 (statement of Judge Hunter); infra note 45 and accompanying
text.
4' For the introduction of S. 295, supra note 35, which was identical to S. 1423, see supra
note 35.
41 See S. 522, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at
160. Senator Bayh introduced S. 522 on March 1, 1979. See 125 CONG. REC. 3685 (1979). Not-
withstanding Senator Mathias' ultimate position that "impeachment is not only the sole constitu-
tional means of removing miscreant judges, it is the sole constitutionally permissible means of
disciplining federal judges," House Hearings, supra note 24, at 154, Mathias had been a co-
sponsor of S. 522. Although sharing Mathias' concern for judicial independence, Senator Bayh
appears to have recognized that legislation of some sort would be passed and that demurrers to the
"more drastic" provisions of the Nunn/DeConcini bill, S. REP. No. 1035, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 70
(1978), were not an adequate substitute for specific alternative proposals. See 125 CONG. REC.
3685-86 (1979); see also Protecting Judges - and the Public, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1979, at
A20, col. 1.
43 See S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at
168. Senator Kennedy introduced S. 678 on March 15, 1979. See 125 CONG. REC. 5229-30
(1979). Title I, part E of this bill, of which Senator DeConcini was a co-sponsor, concerned
judicial discipline. Kennedy acknowledged that, whatever the record of the federal judiciary in the
past, the massive increase in the number of federal judges effected by the Omnibus Judgeship Bill,
Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978), was reason enough to predict more problems in the
future. See Kennedy, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A First Step for Congress to Take,
63 JUDICATURE 8, 11 (1979). Senator Bayh shared that concern, see 125 CONG. REC. 3685
(1979), as did Senator DeConcini, see 125 CONG. REC. 1454 (1979). See also Hearing on
S. 1423, supra note 27, at 89-90 (statement of Attorney General Bell).
44 Both bills also included authority to impose specifically enumerated sanctions. For analyses
of the bills, see Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 28-30 (statement of Judge Hunter); WHEELER
& LEVIN, supra note 30, at 47-48; see also infra note 85.
45 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1976) (amended 1980). On § 332, see supra note 2. For the chronology
of Conference action, see Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 24-25 (statement of Judge Hunter);
House Hearings, supra note 24, at 61-62 (statement of Judge Hunter). The proposed amend-
ments of the Court Administration Committee (which were recommended prior to the introduction
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powers. A resolution adopted at the March 1979 meeting of the Con-
ference approved "principles to be reflected in any legislation dealing
with procedures for inquiries into the conduct of Federal judges."'46
The Conference also recommended that the councils formulate and pro-
mulgate rules, and directed the revision of the Court Administration
Committee's legislative proposals, in accordance with those principles.
47
Thus, by the time hearings were held on the various judicial disci-
pline bills introduced in the Senate, the Judicial Conference, although
not advocating legislation, had expressed a position on the basic shape
that any such legislation should take. In addition, the Conference's res-
olution had made clear that, when it approved draft amendments to 28
U.S.C. § 332, they would be much closer to the Bayh or Kennedy bills
than to the Nunn/DeConcini bill.48 Finally, by providing that "[a]ll
previous Judicial Conference resolutions or comments upon legislation
dealing with the conduct of Federal judges are superseded by this reso-
lution,' ' 49 the Conference had sought finally to dispel any ambiguity
of the Kennedy and Bayh bills) can be found in Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 490-503.
4' (a) Removal of an article III judge from office by any method other than im-
peachment as provided in article I of the Constitution would raise grave con-
stitutional questions which should be avoided.
(b) The primary responsibility for dealing with a complaint against a U.S. judge
should rest initially with the chief judge of the circuit as presiding judge of the
Judicial Council, who may dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or relates to
the merits of a decision or procedural ruling, or may close the complaint after
assuring himself that appropriate corrective action has been taken.
(c) Any complaint not dismissed or closed by the presiding judge should be re-
ferred to a committee appointed by the presiding judge, consisting of an equal
number of circuit and district judges and the presiding judge.
(d) The joint committee should report its findings and recommendations to the
Judicial Council, which should take such action as is appropriate to assure the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within
the circuit.
(e) The Judicial Council may, in its discretion, refer a complaint and the Coun-
cil's recommended action to the Judicial Conference of the United States.
(f) If the Judicial Council concludes that grounds for impeachment may exist, it
should transmit the record upon which its conclusion is based to the Judicial
Conference of the United States; the Judical Conference shall then determine
whether, in all the circumstances, the matter should be referred to the House
of Representatives.
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 5 (Mar. 1979), re-
printed in Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 25, and House Hearings, supra note 24, at 62-63.
7 See id. at 5-6. This resolution included other provisions not discussed in the text. See, e.g.,
infra text accompanying note 49. Moreover, at the same meeting, the Conference adopted a resolu-
tion approving "principles to be reflected in any legislation dealing with the membership of the
Judicial Councils of the circuits," which included district judge representation. Report of the Pro-
ceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 6-7 (Mar. 1979), reprinted in Senate
Hearings, supra note 24, at 30, and House Hearings, supra note 24, at 66-67. Both the Bayh and
Kennedy bills also addressed this issue, see Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 161, 179, as did the
legislative proposals of the Court Administration Committee, id. at 492.
48 See supra text accompanying notes 34-37 & 44. For the change of focus from § 332 to 28
U.S.C. § 372 (1976) (amended 1980), see infra note 66.
" Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 6 (Mar. 1979),
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arising from its previous pronouncements and to speak with one voice.
But the senators heard more than one voice at the hearings. Individual
judges continued to disagree about the need for additional legislation
and the shape that any such legislation should take.5
d. S. 1873
The passage of S. 1423 by the Senate and the determination of
Senators Nunn and DeConcini ensured Senate consideration of some
judicial discipline legislation in the first session of the Ninety-Sixth
Congress. Doubts about the adequacy of existing arrangements and of
the legislation proposed by the Judicial Conference caused members of
the Senate to work with representatives of the Conference in drafting a
compromise bill, introduced as S. 1873.51 The bill did not purport to
authorize removal, and it endowed the councils with first-line responsi-
bility. But S. 1873 was irreconcilable with the existing structure and
theory of federal judicial administration and thus proved unacceptable
to the Judicial Conference.2 Those in Congress who had consulted the
reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 25, and House Hearings, supra note 24, at 63; see
supra note 32 and accompanying text.
" In addition to the Senate Hearings, supra note 24, Senator Kennedy held hearings on his
bill, S. 678, supra note 43, and on a similar bill sponsored by the Administration, S. 677, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), at which there was some testimony concerning S. 678's discipline provi-
sions. See Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678].
Opinions from judges at the two sets of hearings included support for the Nunn/DeConcini
bill, see Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 46-48 (statement of Judge Lumbard), support for the
Kennedy or Bayh bills, see Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678, supra, at 5 (statement of Chief Judge
Coffin); Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 253 (statement submitted by Judge Adams), and the
recommendation that Congress defer legislation until there had been time to evaluate experience
under rules promulgated by the councils pursuant to the March 1979 Conference resolution, see
Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678, supra, at 26 (statement of Judge Newman). Not even those who
had labored on behalf of the Conference agreed about what should be done. The Conference's
authorized spokesman, Judge Hunter, and Chief Judge Browning expressed the view that statu-
tory amendments along the lines indicated by the March 1979 Conference resolution were desira-
ble even if not necessary. See Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 24, 26 (statement of Judge
Hunter); id. at 43, 45 (statement of Chief Judge Browning). Judge Wallace, on the other hand,
favored a very minor change in the existing statutory language. See id. at 36, 40 (statement of
Judge Wallace).
5 S. 1873; supra note 1. The process of compromise in the Senate had begun before the 96th
Congress. Indeed, the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit had been urged to
"adopt, in principle, and recommend the adoption of" the Nunn/DeConcini bill on the grounds
that Senator Nunn had changed his bill in response to the recommendation of the Judicial Confer-
ence and that it was "very important, that we follow along with this agreement." Proceedings of
the Thirty-Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 81 F.R.D. 263,
341-42 (1978) (statements of Judge Tamm and Chief Judge Wright).
Members of the Senate and their staffs "worked very closely and amicably with the judicial
conference in . . . efforts to draft . . . legislation" and "made many accommodations to their
views." 125 CONG. REC. 30,063 (1979) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
52 The bill, which is reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 311, would have created
a special court with power to review actions of the judicial councils and to conduct de novo hear-
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Conference in drafting S. 1873 rejected and probably resented its at-
tempt to defeat the bill.53 The Conference's efforts were not unavailing,
however. Even with a broad-based group of sponsors, S. 1873 passed
only with difficulty, encountering stiff opposition on the Senate floor.
5
1
2. Patience and Progress in the House
The House, which had not actively considered judicial discipline
legislation for many years,55 was exposed to an even greater number of
legislative proposals than the Senate in the first session of the Ninety-
Sixth Congress.5" But it was the House, in which positions on the is-
sues had not hardened, attitudes toward particular approaches were not
proprietary, and patience with the judiciary had not been exhausted,
that bore major responsibility for fashioning the ultimate compromise
legislation enacted in 1980.
The hearing record in the Senate had been closed in mid-1979.
But when the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
ings. It was thought to portend a more elaborate and adversary process than was warranted by the
record and in light of the concern for judicial independence. In these respects, among others,
S. 1873 sustained prudential and even constitutional opposition, although it neither authorized
removal nor established a bureaucracy outside the judiciary. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note
14, at 4, 18-19; Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 697-
700 (1980); sources cited infra note 53.
The Judicial Conference found S. 1873 unacceptable, and Judge Elmo Hunter, the Chair-
man of the Conference's Court Administration Committee, so informed each member of the Senate
in a four-page letter, the conclusions of which were summarized by Judge Hunter as follows:
In summary, the Judicial Conference believes:
1. that the objectives which S.1873 is designed to achieve are already available
through existing processes and procedures;
2. that legislation is therefore not now necessary;
3. that existing procedures will more responsively and responsibly resolve com-
plaints in less time than would S. 1873; and
4. that, if legislative action is to be taken, it should consist of statutorily authoriz-
ing those existing processes and procedures not yet expressly embodied in title
28 of the United States Code, but applicable by rule in ten of the eleven judicial
circuits.
Letter from Hon. Elmo B. Hunter to all Senators (Oct. 22, 1979) (copy on file with the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review).
" Senator Bayh stated on the floor that, in light of the accommodations made to the judiciary
in S. 1873, he "was somewhat disappointed. . . to learn a few days ago that the Judicial Confer-
ence Committee working on the issue has informed the Members of the Senate by letter that it
considers S. 1873 unacceptable." 125 CONG. REC. 30,063 (1979). His remarks thereafter were
clearly in response to the arguments made in Judge Hunter's letter. See id. at 30,063-64.
In addition to Judge Hunter's letter, senators apparently received many telephone calls from
federal judges. See 125 CONG. REC. 30,087 (1979) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
" See 125 CONG. REC. 30,052-53 (1979) (statement of Sen. Laxalt); id. at 30,056-58,
30,095-96 (statements of Sen. Mathias); id. at 30,058 (statement of Sen. Heflin). The bill passed
56-33, with 11 Senators not voting. Id. at 30,100.
55 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. But see H.R. 9042, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123
CONG. REC. 28,892 (1977) (introduced by Rep. Kastenmeier).
" The various House bills introduced prior to the opening of the House hearings on July 12,
1979, are reproduced in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 222-88.
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Administration of Justice, chaired by Representative Kastenmeier, ad-
journed on July 13, 1979, it was "subject to the call of the Chair," to
be reconvened "sometime in the future. '57 Congressman Kastenmeier
took his-time in reconvening his subcommittee's hearings.5 , S. 1873
had been passed in the Senate, but not without substantial opposition.
Kastenmeier himself had introduced the legislative proposals of the Ju-
dicial Conference as H.R. 6330."9 Most of the judicial councils of the
circuits had promulgated rules pursuant to the March 1979 recommen-
dation of the Conference. Whereas Judge Elmo Hunter had argued
that the councils' action was reason enough for Congress to stay its
hand, 0 others drew the contrary inference. Criticism of the councils'
rules for incompleteness and disuniformity came from a number of
sources."' Elaborated by the spokesman of the Department of Justice, 2
which continued to support "earlier proposals," such as the Nunn/
DeConcini bill,6" that criticism was difficult to ignore. In light of the
Senate's action, the seemingly equivocal position of the Judicial Confer-
57 Id. at 123-24; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. The testimony prior to ad-
journment largely duplicated that at the Senate hearings, see House Hearings, supra note 24, at 1-
124, but because only Judges Hunter and Wallace and Chief Judge Browning appeared for the
judiciary, the testimony suggested greater unanimity within the judiciary than actually exipted.
Judge Wallace, however, continued to argue for very minor statutory amendments. See id. at 74;
supra note 50. Moreover, he disagreed with Judge Hunter's view that the Conference's actions
after the passage of S. 1423, the Nunn/DeConcini bill, did not represent a change in position. See
House Hearings, supra note 24, at 92-93.
" Almost nine months separated the first two days of hearings (July 12 and 13, 1979) from
the second (March 27 and 31, 1980). The purpose of the recess was to permit "the Members and
staff. . . further [to] investigate the need for the legislation and. . . delineate the effects it would
have on the independence and autonomy of all three branches of government." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 14, at 6.
5s H.R. 6330, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at
304. Representative Kastenmeier introduced H.R. 6330 on Jan. 29, 1980. See 126 CONG. REC.
H387 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1980). For the bill's provenance, see House Hearings, supra note 24, at
126.
60 See letter from Hon. Elmo B. Hunter to all Senators, supra note 52; see also S. REP. NO.
362, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT] (additional views of
Sen. Mathias); supra note 50.
"' See, e.g., letter from Herbert H. Anderson to Robert W. Kastenmeier (May 22, 1980),
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 204.
'2 See House Hearings, supra note 24, at 161-62, 165-67 (statement of Assistant Attorney
General Maurice Rosenberg); see also Federal Circuit Councils Adopt Disciplinary Rules, JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT REPORTER, Spring 1980, at 1-4; infra note 180. This criticism was accepted by
Congress. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4; see also id. at 31 (supplemental views of Rep.
Butler); 126 CONG. REC. H8786 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980) (statement of Rep. Railsback); id. at
H8788 (statement of Rep. Butler); id. at S13,859 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini).
"' House Hearings, supra note 24, at 163 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Rosen-
berg). In 1980, the ABA's House of Delegates adopted a resolution that supported in principle
both the Nunn/DeConcini bill and S. 1873, among others. SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 20 (1980). The same body declined
to adopt a recommendation urging Congress to defer action until experience under the councils'
post-March 1979 procedures demonstrated whether legislation was required. See id. at 18.
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ence,64 criticism of the councils' rules, and continuing support for the
Nunn/DeConcini bill, cooperation with the federal judiciary signalled
legislation, not abdication."5
B. Congress's Choices
1. Specification of Process
Against this background, it is easier to understand the reasons for
the shape the legislation ultimately assumed. Specification of the pro-
cess for resolving complaints within the judiciary had, in the end, be-
come the focus of legislative debate. Moreover, some specification had
been sought, albeit not consistently, by the Judicial Conference, and the
post-March 1979 rules of the judicial councils had been criticized for
silence or inconsistency on important aspects of the process they
contemplated.
The House used as its basic model the bill approved by the Judi-
cial Conference, H.R. 6330,66 the structure of which was also reflected
in part in the Bayh and Kennedy bills. All of these bills endowed the
judicial councils with the primary responsibility to resolve complaints
of judicial misconduct or disability, and H.R. 6330 and the Bayh bill
incorporated prior screening by the chief judge.67 The arguments in
favor of the latter feature, apart from the Conference's endorsement,
stressed efficiency and informal collegial resolution of complaints.6 8
Some of the same arguments bore on the choice between review by a
special court, as proposed by S. 1873, and review by the Judicial Con-
ference, as proposed by H.R. 6330 and the Kennedy bill." Here, how-
ever, other considerations came into play that were also relevant to the
substantive question of standards for disciplinary action. The idea of
" See supra notes 50, 52 & 53. But see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4-5 (Conference
supported "the establishment of uniform rules through congressional action").
" The desire to cooperate with the federal judiciary was evident in the remarks of Chairman
Kastenmeier and others on the subcommittee. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 24, at 174
(Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 182 (Rep. Mazzoli).
" See supra text accompanying note 59; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. Although the
Conference's March 1979 resolution contemplated that legislation clarifying the councils' powers
would amend 28 U.S.C. § 332, see supra text accompanying notes 45-47, the bill finally approved
by the Conference proposed the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1976) (amended 1980). See
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 57 (Sept. 1979).
8? See Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 29 (statement of Judge Hunter); House Hearings,
supra note 24, at 305-06.
" See supra text accompanying note 46; Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 29 (statement of
Judge Hunter); 126 CONG. REC. S13,859, 13,860 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini); letter from Hon. Elmo B. Hunter to all Senators, supra note 52.
49 See Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 29 (statement of Judge Hunter); House Hearings,
supra note 24, at 308. For the arguments, see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4, 18-19; letter
from Hon. Elmo B. Hunter to all Senators, supra note 52.
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"judicial administration" took on a life of its own.
As judicial misconduct and disability legislation was refined in
Congress, the position of those who maintained constitutional objections
to any legislative proposal in the area became progressively uncomfort-
able. These judges, legislators, and scholars were confronted by the ex-
istence of legislation that the Judicial Conference and some councils
regarded as authority enough to deal with problems of misconduct or
disability. 0 Senator Bayh well stated their conundrum: "If these [sic]
are indeed serious constitutional questions with any legislative grants of
authority to the judicial branch to practice discipline, then in all good
conscience ... we should act today to strike section 332 from the
United States Code."7' Faced with an unpalatable choice, people of this
mind were driven to fine distinctions between judicial discipline and
judicial administration and to subtle inquiries into intent."2 For those
who supported, or at least could live with, additional legislation, such
distinctions, however opaque, became arguments for adherence to the
fundamentals of the existing system of judicial administration:73 adver-
sary proceedings in a special court surely look adjudicatory rather than
administrative."4
2. Substantive Ambiguity
However it might be expressed, disagreement about standards for
judicial discipline was not about judicial as opposed to administrative
70 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
71 125 CONG. RE. 30,063 (1979).
" See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 24, at 38-39, 45 (statement of Monroe Freedman);
Kaufman, supra note 37, at 708-09.
72 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 35-42 (statement of Judge Wallace); id. at 58
(statement of Chief Judge Browning); House Hearings, supra note 24, at 73-79 (statement of
Judge Wallace); id. at 90-91 (statement of Chief Judge Browning); see also Wallace, supra note
25; Wallace, supra note 35.
7' While the Conference's March resolution and its draft bill both provide for review
by the Judicial Conference itself, we believe the relative undesirability of review by
a "special court" is founded upon the type of remedial action being taken. Circuit
councils are not trial courts. Even under the very formal processes required by
S. 1873 their functions would not be truly adjudicatory, nor would they really be
proceeding in a traditional adversary setting. Nor should they. The issues before
them will not be matters of guilt or innocence, liability or lack of it; the issues will
be, and should be, questions concerning the "administration of the business of the
courts." Most of those issues will be resolved with administrative remedies. Only a
few may be of such serious weight that they will require actual "adjudication." In
those few cases, we believe that impeachment under Article I of the Constitution
should be utilized - even if it is cumbersome. If a judge's conduct is beyond an
administrative remedy, then the body constitutionally authorized to adjudicate that
judge's behavior should do so without any "prejudgment" of the question.
Letter from Hon. Elmo B. Hunter to all Senators, supra note 52 (emphasis in original).
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power, but about the extent to which Congress and the judiciary could
and should go in regulating the conduct of federal judges. There was
agreement that misconduct or disability could not be predicated on the
merits of a judge's or magistrate's rulings."5 Similarly, concern for judi-
cial independence had prompted a consensus that any legislative mecha-
nism must provide for the speedy dismissal of frivolous complaints or
complaints not within the jurisdiction conferred by the statute., There
remained, however, ample room for disagreement about the ambit of
that jurisdiction. The state models drawn on in S. 1423 and S. 295,
the Nunn/DeConcini bill,77 and referred to in the Senate Judiciary
Committee's report on S. 1873,8 suggested that the regulatory reach
75 See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 8; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 10, 18-
19; see also House Hearings, supra note 24, at 27 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). Under the Act:
(c)(3) After expeditiously reviewing a complaint, the chief judge, by written order
stating his reasons, may -
(A) dismiss the complaint, if he finds it to be (i) not in conformity with
paragraph (1) of this subsection; (ii) directly related to the merits of a deci-
sion or procedural ruling, or (iii) frivolous, or
(B) conclude the proceeding if he finds that appropriate corrective action
has been taken ...
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
A complaint "not in conformity with paragraph (1) of this subsection" includes one that does
not allege "that a circuit, district, or bankruptcy judge, or a magistrate, has engaged in conduct
prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts," or that
"such a judge or magistrate is unable to discharge all of the duties of office by reason of mental or
physical disability." See Neisser, supra note 3, at 152. Review of final orders rendered by the chief
judge under this section may be sought by petition to the Judicial Council. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10)
(Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 9.
71 Senator Mathias objected that S. 1873 failed "to deal with clearly frivolous and non-meri-
torious complaints with expediency and finality," because it did not authorize screening by the
Chief Judge. House Hearings, supra note 24, at 158 (statement of Sen. Mathias). The Senate
report on S. 1873, however, noted approval of such a procedure, implemented by local rule. See
SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 8. The Conference was concerned that "[u]nder S. 1873 every
complaint can potentially be 'bootstrapped' to full review by the special court." Letter from Hon.
Elmo B. Hunter to all Senators, supra note 52. For the Act's resolution of this problem, see supra
note 75; infra note 166; see also supra text accompanying notes 67-68; HOUSE REPORT, supra note
14, at 10; 126 CONG. REC. S13,859-60 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
77 S. 295, supra note 35. In perpetuating the Nunn/DeConcini bill's "good behavior" stan-
dard, Senator Kennedy took on a load of empty baggage. See S. 678, supra note 43, § 141, re-
printed in Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 182. It is not just that the standard was a red flag
likely to keep alive constitutional debate that the elimination of removal was designed to quiet.
See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 119 (statement of Paul Bender). That very debate
raised the question whether the words had any ascertainable content. Compare Kaufman, supra
note 37, with Berger, "Chilling Judicial Independence": A Scarecrow, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 822
(1979), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 585; see also REPORT ON S. 678 AND
S. 862 BY THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK (1979), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 826. The Nunn/DeCon-
cini bill had attempted to fill the gap, resorting to state models for statutory definitions. See
S. 1423, § 388; S. 295, § 388, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 146-47; S. REP.
No. 1035, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-36 (1978); see also WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 45-
46.
7 S. 1873 abandoned "good behavior" in favor of the standard under which the councils had
been operating since 1948. See S. 1873, reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 312;
supra note 37. But it may not, and should not, have gone unnoticed that the definitions, although
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was long indeed, extending to a great variety of conduct not directly
related to the performance of official functions."9 On the other hand,
the report seemed to disclaim any such purpose,80 and Senator Bayh
emphasized the Act's limited jurisdiction."1
It is not surprising that the House eschewed a detailed elaboration
of the standard for disciplinary action in the bill it passed and in the
bill's legislative history.82 The language adopted by the House and
no longer part of the statute, continued to be invoked, and state models continued to be cited, in
the Senate Judiciary Committee's report. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, 'at 8-9. The origins
of this part of the Senate report, see S. REP. NO. 1035, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-36 (1978); supra
note 77, provide an explanation for sentences in it that are otherwise incomprehensible. See, e.g.,
SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 9 ("If it is true that the specified grounds for [sic] becoming
'terms of art', the Committee does not believe that it should attempt in this report to add a legisla-
tive gloss to the terms.").
" For an analysis of the state experience, see Martineau, Disciplining Judges for Nonofficial
Conduct: A Survey and Critique of the Law, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 225 (1981). The amendments
proposed by the Judicial Conference's Committee on Court Administration would have permitted
a complaint to allege that the subject of the complaint "has engaged or is engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice by bringing the judicial office into disrepute." Senate
Hearings, supra note 24, at 494. Such a standard was also part of S. 1873 until the full Judiciary
Committee markup, when it was deleted at the suggestion of Senator Bayh, "because it was felt
that this standard could be too intrusive on the judge's personal life and was subject to possible
abuse." 125 CONG. REC. 30,050 (1979) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); see Neisser, supra note 3,
at 152. By that time as well, the Conference had thought better of the standard, and the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts had also requested its deletion. See 125 CONG. REc.
30,050 (1979) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). Nonetheless, the report on S. 1873 stated that the
standard finally adopted, with which the judiciary was familiar, see supra note 78, included,
among other things, "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute." SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 9. For further critical comment on the
standard, see WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 64 & n.156.
" "Complaints relating to the conduct of a member of the judiciary which are not connected
with the judicial office or which do not affect the administration of justice are without jurisdiction
and therefore outside the scope of this legislation." SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 3; see also
id. at 6. The problem, of course, is cabining the notion of effect. See Martineau, supra note 79, at
237-45.
1 "Extrajudicial habits and behavior are outside the reach of the bill. It is only when a
judge's behavior affects his performance on the bench that a complaint is valid." 125 CONG. REC.
30,064 (1979) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (emphasis added); see also Senate Hearings, supra note
24, at 60.
"a See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 10; infra note 85. The Nunn/DeConcini laundry
list of definitions, let alone a reference to state law, would have raised questions of consistency
with the "inquisitorial-administrative" model the House purported to adopt. See HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 14, at 4-5, 24; see also House Hearings, supra note 24, at 42 (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
The basic thrust of the federal procedure is different from that of state disciplinary
procedures. The process established by Section 3 of the federal Act is deliberately
drawn to an administrative model rather than an adjudicatory one. Its primary
purpose is not to ferret out and punish offending judges but to improve the func-
tioning of the court by solving administrative problems. This difference is reflected
in many ways. Most state disciplinary agencies are independent of the judiciary and
include lay members; state processes are generally directed against "wilful miscon-
duct in office" or "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute." The federal statute establishes a procedure entirely
within the judk iary. As I have noted, the approach is not adjudicatory but adminis-
trative. The procedures are not directed primarily at the judge but at the function-
ing of the court. The process is initiated not by alleging "misconduct" or "conduct
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agreed to by the Senate - "conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts" - was famil-
iar to the judiciary8" and had been sought by the Judicial Conference,
which, if there was to be legislation, was concerned about clarifying
power thought to exist. 84 Substantively, the judges must rely in the fu-
ture, as they relied in the past, on their colleagues to protect judicial
independence.8"
that brings the judicial office into disrepute," but by alleging "conduct prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts."
Browning, supra note 3, at 204.
More important, an attempt at definitional precision would have been controversial. See
supra text accompanying notes 77-81; see also H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 128 (1967).
During the House Hearings, Assistant Attorney General Rosenberg argued against per-
petuation of the standard under which the councils had been operating on the ground that it was
not broad enough to reach conduct that ought properly to be within the powers of the councils to
regulate. See House Hearings, supra note 24, at 163-64, 169-70, 176. In so doing, he neglected to
note the broad interpretation that had been given to that language by the Conference in 1961 and
again in 1974. See supra note 37. The differences in the language of the Act, compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 332(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981) ("all necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expedi-
tious administration of justice within its circuit") with id. at § 372(c)(1) ("conduct prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts") are evidence that Con-
gress adverted to the judiciary's gloss and regarded the formulations as fungible. See HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at 9; 126 CONG. REC. S13,859, S13,860 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement
of Sen. DeConcini).
" See supra notes 50 & 52; see also Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 58 (statements of
Chief Judge Browning).
11 In eschewing detailed elaboration of the standard, the House report did not provide much
guidance on its interpretation. The standard is said clearly to incorporate "complaints regarding
impeachable behavior [and] violations of the criminal laws of any State or the United States."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 10. Assuming such complaints have merit, those alleging im-
peachable behavior will end up in the House. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c)(7)(B) & (c)(8) (Supp. V
1981). Indeed, the potential of council investigations to "reduce the impeachment burden upon
Congress" through the development of a record or the inducement of voluntary action was cited as
a reason to enact legislation in the area. House Hearings, supra note 24, at 89 (statement of Chief
Judge Browning); see also 126 CONG. REC. 13,865 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond). Action on complaints alleging criminal behavior is likely to be deferred pending in-
vestigation by federal law enforcement authorities. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 24, at
88, 105 (statements of Chief Judge Browning). As to both, see Neisser, supra note 3, at 151-52. In
the vast gray area, see supra text accompanying notes 75-81, the House report suggests that the
judiciary, although winning a number of battles concerning the standard for judicial discipline, lost
the war. But see Neisser, supra note 3, at 152. In explaining the Act's provision for discretionary
referral of a complaint by a judicial council to the Judicial Conference, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1981), the House report observes: "Likewise, it could involve an allega-
tion that several judges have engaged in activities demeaning to the bench; assume, for example,
that after a meeting of a circuit's judicial conference, a large number of judges become intoxicated
in a bar of ill repute." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 12.
On the other hand, the House responded to criticism concerning the absence of enumerated
sanctions in existing legislation and in most of the councils' post-March 1979 rules. See House
Hearings, supra note 24, at 161-62, 164-65 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Rosenberg).
The House added to H.R. 6330 a list of sanctions drawn from S. 1873, which in turn appears to
have been influenced in this aspect by the Bayh and Kennedy bills. See supra note 44; see also
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. The authorized sanctions are contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c)(6) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 7. Finally, Senator DeConcini hoped that, in
exercising its power to review matters on petition by the complainant or the subject of a complaint,
the Judicial Conference or a standing committee thereof "while not an independent review court,
will provide for uniformity of decisions and the building of precedents." 126 CONG. REc. S13,858
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3. Procedural Particularity
The organization, jurisdiction, and powers of, and the substantive
standards to be observed by, the recipients of delegated legislative
power are the recognized province of Congress. It has been unusual,
however, for Congress to concern itself with - although it has the
power to prescribe - the details of procedure for implementing tasks
delegated to the judiciary."6
The public record of council actions prior to the introduction of
the Nunn/DeConcini bill evoked skepticism not only about the ade-
quacy of existing statutory authority but also about the fairness with
which asserted authority had been exercised. In two widely cited cases,
it appeared that councils had acted without providing notice to the per-
son affected and without affording him an opportunity to be heard.
87
Thus, the federal judiciary's claim that informality and collegiality in
handling complaints of misconduct or disability augured the best results
consistent with judicial independence was tempered by concern that,.in
the past, informality had produced unfairness and in fact imperiled the
independence of individual federal judges.
When it became clear that a greater measure of formality in disci-
plinary procedures was expected, one matter that received attention
from virtually all of the councils was the provision of procedural pro-
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980); see also id. at S13,860-61 (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at
H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). The provision in question, as
amended by the Senate, is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note
9.
s In the case of supervisory court rulemaking, the pattern for many years was for Congress
to grant general authority to the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure, reserving the
right to review any such rules before they become effective. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
The rulemakers strenuously and successfully resisted legislative modification of or additions to
court rules, fearing any derogation from the principle of institutional competence, and the reality
of institutional power, for which members of the bar and the federal judiciary had struggled so
long. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1178-79 (1982);
c. id. at 1153-54 n.601 (submission of amendments); letter from William D. Mitchell to the Hon.
Warren Olney, Jr. (Jan. 15, 1938) (Charles E. Clark Papers, Yale University Library, box 111,
folder 39) (congressional approval).
By 1980 Congress had broken the pattern and ceased routinely to acquiesce in supervisory
court rules. See Burbank, supra, at 1018-20; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976). Although that
general change in Congress's attitude towards rulemaking by the judiciary should be acknowl-
edged, the Act's procedural particularity is much more clearly the result of concerns and consider-
ations specific to judicial misconduct and disability legislation and of the process by which it was
formulated. In any event, court rulemaking, whether supervisory or local, may not be the most
appropriate model for comparison. Congress has, of course, circumscribed the procedural discre-
tion of administrative agencies. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5-8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554-
57 (1976).
87 See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970); In re Imperial
"400" National, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); see also Tydings,
supra note 24, at 322-23; Wallace, supra note 24, at 315-22.
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tections for the subject of a complaint.8 8 Thereafter, the Judicial Con-
ference approved a bill that contained most of the procedural require-
ments found in the Act, including various notice provisions and the
requirement that council rules afford procedural rights to the subject of
a complaint.89 It is interesting to observe the federal judiciary, which
traditionally has resisted legislative attempts to circumscribe its freedom
in rulemaking, 90 proposing such restrictions.9 1 One senses the duality of
judicial independence: the institution sought to be protected from, and
the individual by, Congress.
In the end, Congress, resisting pressure to enact or require com-
prehensive uniform rules of procedure,9 2 accepted the argument that
initial experimentation by the judicial councils of the circuits would
yield better results.9" But Congress was unwilling to furnish the coun-
cils with a blank check.
In suggesting an "inquisitorial-administrative" model for the con-
duct of investigations, 94 the House report responded to formal and phil-
osophical distinctions that had been urged in support of the existing
structure and to the concern that an "accusatorial-adversary" model
would undermine judicial independence.9 5 In adopting the Conference's
requirement that council rules afford certain basic procedural rights to
the subject of a complaint, the House report revealed the elusiveness of
Thus, although criticizing the councils' post-March 1979 rules, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Rosenberg observed that "virtually all of the circuits authorize procedures to ensure due pro-
cess for an accused judge." House Hearings, supra note 24, at 166.
In its 1974 statement of "Powers, Functions and Duties of Circuit Councils," see supra note
37, the Conference had opined:
6. Before- any action is taken with respect to a particular judge or other person
attached to the courts in the circuit, that judge or other person should be invited to
present his views to the council after being advised of the nature of the action which
may be taken together with the reasons. Monitoring the substance of judicial deci-
sions is not a function of the judicial council.
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 8 (Mar. 1979).
89 See H.R. 6330. For the origins of this bill, see supra note 59.
90 See supra note 86.
'2 Some of the procedural requirements in H.R. 6330 can perhaps be laid to perceived con-
stitutional necessity, but their very statement suggests, and the history confirms, see supra text
accompanying note 87, that the perception had not been universal. In addition, H.R. 6330 lacked
provisions for review of council rules and supervisory rulemaking by the Conference, with the
result that its authors may have felt, or anticipated that Congress would feel, the need for some
control of local rulemaking.
" See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 24, at 189 (resolution of American Judicature Soci-
ety Executive Committee); letter from Herbert H. Anderson to Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier
(May 22, 1980), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 204; AJS Supports Discipline
Bill But Urges Congress to Strengthen It, JUDICIAL CONDUCT REPORTER, Winter 1980, at 1.
03 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 2, 10-11; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13; see
also House Hearings, supra note 24, at 101, 174.
" See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14, quoted in part infra text accompanying note
117.
,5 See supra text accompanying notes 70-74; note 82.
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some of those distinctions and the variousness of judicial indepen-
dence." Moreover, the House added to H.R. 6330 provisions authoriz-
ing the Judicial Conference to modify any rule promulgated by a judi-
cial council and to prescribe rules. 7 Congress had, as we have seen,
ample evidence that not all the councils were responsive to invitations
to experiment and that experimentation could lead to disuniformity
harmful to the goals of the legislation." The structure Congress finally
approved suggested the Conference as the natural body to monitor local
rulemaking and to ensure whatever uniformity, in addition to that re-
quired by the statute, was appropriate.
Consistently with its view that the House bill lacked adequate bal-
ance and thus did not go far enough to ensure public accountability, the
Senate added, and the House endorsed, a provision requiring some pro-
cedural protection for the complainant in council rules. 99
4. Oversight
Congress was not content to draw procedural boundaries and leave
to the Judicial Conference the task of reconciling or completing the
pictures drawn by the judicial councils. The Senate's insistent concern
about public accountability - after the smoke had cleared, the major
goal of the legislation - yielded more than enhanced procedural pro-
Nonetheless, the potential excesses of a circuit council must be controlled. As a
consequence, paragraph (c)(11) requires that minimal due process rights be ac-
corded any judicial officer whose actions or state of health are being investigated by
a circuit council. The net effect of this paragraph is that the possibility of one group
of federal judges arbitrarily "ganging up" [sic] or "hazing" another judge is
prevented.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14 (footnote omitted).
7 See H.R. 7974, supra note 1 (proposing amendments adding § 372(c)(11) and amending
§ 331). These provisions, as reflected in the Act, are quoted supra note 11. For other procedural
protections, taken from H.R. 6330, see supra text accompanying note 89.
9 For this reason alone, although it might be argued that the Conference's powers are lim-
ited to reconciling disuniformities in the local rules of the councils and prescribing rules for the
conduct of its own business under the Act, that interpretation seems too narrow. See 126 CONG.
REC. S13,861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at H10,191 (daily ed.
Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). Compare HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13-14
with id. at 15-16. S. 1873 had authorized the Judicial Conference either to promulgate rules for
the councils or to authorize the councils to promulgate their own rules. The bill also gave the
Conference the power to modify any rule.
Withal, a clarification of the Conference's powers is desirable. See also infra text accompany-
ing note 281.
" See 126 CONG. REC. S13,860-61 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini);
id. at H10,190-91 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). The provision added
by the Senate can be found in 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11)(C) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 11.
For other Senate amendments designed "to preserve equal treatment between the parties in the
process," see 126 CONG. REC. S13,860 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini);
id. at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). The Senate's amend-
ments can be found in 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 9.
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tection for the complainant. Congress had been urged to accept judicial
self-regulation as an experiment that could be replaced if the results
were unsatisfactory, 00 but it had also been urged by others to follow
the experiment closely. 01 The House bill added to H.R. 6330 a re-
quirement of reports to Congress. 102 The Senate attempted to make the
process of resolving complaints less impenetrable by highlighting the
distinction between confidentiality and privilege 03 and by requiring
that written orders issued by the councils and the Conference be made
publicly available and, in most cases, include a statement of reasons. '"
The Senate's amendments were accepted,105 and the obviously coordi-
nated statements of the managers of the legislation suggested a determi-
nation to ensure public accountability through legislative oversight.10"
10 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678, supra note 50, at 5 (statement of Chief Judge
Coffin); Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 60 (statement of Judge Wallace).
101 See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 7 (joint statement of Clark Mollenhoff and
Greg Rushford); House Hearings, supra note 24, at 121 (joint statement of Clark Mollenhoff and
Greg Rushford).
101 See H.R. 7974, supra note 1 (proposing amendment adding § 604(h)(2)). S. 1873 had
contained a similar provision. As enacted, the requirement appears in 28 U.S.C. § 604(h)(2)
(Supp. V 1981). See also infra text accompanying notes 259-270.
103 See 126 CONG. REC. S13,861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id.
at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). As revised to delete any
reference to privilege, the Act's confidentiality provision states:
(c)(14) All papers, documents, and records of proceedings related to investigations
conducted under this subsection shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed by
any person in any proceeding unless -
(A) the judicial council of the circuit, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, or the Senate or the House of Representatives by resolution, releases
any such material which is believed necessary to an impeachment investiga-
tion or trial of a judge under article I of the Constitution; or
(B) authorized in writing by the judge or magistrate who is the subject to
[sic] the complaint and by the chief judge of the circuit, the Chief Justice, or
the chairman of the standing committee established under section 331 of this
title.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14) (Supp. V 1981).
'0 See 126 CONG. REC. S13,861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id.
at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(15)
(Supp. V 1981) provides:
(c)(15) Each written order to implement any action under paragraph (6)(B) of this
subsection, which is issued by a judicial council, the Judicial Conference, or the
standing committee established under section 331 of this title, shall be made availa-
ble to the public through the appropriate clerk's office of the court of appeals for
the circuit. Unless contrary to the interests of justice, each such order issued under
this paragraph shall be accompanied by written reasons therefor.
See 126 CONG. REC. H10,192 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980).
106 Compare 126 CONG. REC. S13,861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeCon-
cini) with id. at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). Both state-
ments include, with slight variation, the following:
In addition to those four substantive changes included in the Senate amend-
ment, both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees believe that there should be
a continuing dialog between the legislative and judicial branches, and vigorous over-
sight by Congress. Section 5 of the proposal requires that the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts shall include in his annual report
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III. RULEMAKING UNDER THE ACT
Neither judges nor those who write about their work product have
shown much interest in the jurisprudence of federal court rulemak-
ing. °0 As a result, we lack an accepted framework within which to
evaluate prospective procedural rules. Moreover, because attention in
federal court rulemaking has fastened almost exclusively on national
rules, our impoverishment is particularly acute with respect to local
rulemaking.1 8 To a great extent, therefore, a critique of council
rulemaking under the Act must proceed from normative premises as to
which there is no consensus. Unless, however, rulemakers can be
brought to an articulated, or at least articulable, position on such issues
as level of detail, uniformity, and rulemaking power, we are doomed to
a regime characterized by ad hoc justification on the one hand and ad
hoc repudiation on the other. Discretion is, of course, an instrument of
.power. Those who would embrace it are well advised to consider where
ultimate power lies and to be alert to the risks of its exercise.
A. Minimalism
There can be little doubt that Congress expected the councils to
accept the Act's invitation to promulgate rules. Influences shaping that
expectation included the Judicial Conference's March 1979 resolution
and the practical political considerations that animated it, dissatisfac-
tion with the rules of the councils promulgated pursuant to that resolu-
tion, and the overwhelming trend of the judiciary, since 1934, to make
procedural law by prospective rules.109 Indeed, Congress accepted local
filed with the Congress a summary of the number of complaints filed with each
judicial council under section 372(c) of title 28, United States Code, indicating their
general nature and the disposition of those upon which action has been taken.
In order to better perform its oversight responsibilities, the committee will give
serious consideration to making requests for other reports on the implementation of
the act, as well as possible oversight hearings and subsequent perfecting amend-
ments to the statute.
'07 But see, eg., Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983); Clark, Special
Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493 (1950).
Questions of supervisory court rulemaking process and structure in the federal system have,
however, received considerable attention. See, e.g., W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS
AND POSSIBILITIES (1981); J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 21-115
(1977); Burbank, supra, at 998 n.2. Moreover, there is an analogically useful literature in admin-
istrative law. See, e.g., 2 K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE chs. 7, 8, 10 (2d ed. 1979);
see also Burbank, supra note 86, at 1193-94.
10" But see, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 107, at 117-45; Flanders, Local Rules in Federal
District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or Information?, 14 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 213 (1981); see
also Burbank, supra note 107, at 998 n.2.
I" In addition to the considerations mentioned in the text, it should be noted that the Act
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rulemaking on the theory that, at least initially, the benefits of experi-
mentation would outweigh its costs.11 The benefits were, however,
speculative, and there was evidence of the costs."' In prescribing uni-
form procedure for some of the "important issues" as to which silence
or dissonance might have had a serious adverse effect on the achieve-
ment of the Act's purposes, and in providing the Judicial Conference
with powers of review and initiation, Congress sought to guide and
circumscribe elaborative local rulemaking, not to stifle it." 2
Since all of the councils have rules in place, 3 apparently they
have heard Congress's message. But have they? Most of the councils
have chosen not to elaborate in any detail the process and skeletal pro-
cedure set forth in the Act.11 4 Some of the councils' rules even fail to
treat matters that were dealt with in those councils' pre-Act rules.1 5
Much of what little is new in the councils' rules addresses matters of
minor significance; and some of what is new is of questionable valid-
does require the specialized courts to promulgate rules. See supra note 19. The reason for the
disparate treatment appears to lie in the origins of the respective rulemaking provisions. H.R.
6330, supra note 59, the Judicial Conference's bill, included a provision authorizing (but not
requiring) the councils to promulgate rules. The House modified that provision by empowering
the Judicial Conference to modify council rules and itself to prescribe rules. See supra text accom-
panying note 97. All of the provisions respecting the specialized courts were added by the House.
Compare H.R. 6330 with H.R. 7974, supra note 1.
In addition, the expectation that the Judicial Conference would exercise its rulemaking power
is explicit in the Act's legislative history. See 126 CONG. REC. S13,861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier). Thus far, the Conference has not done so. See infra note 196. Finally, the concerns that
led Congress to require procedural protections for the subject of a complaint and the complainant
in council rules, see supra text accompanying notes 87, 94-96 & 99, seemingly render academic
the question whether a council that did not promulgate prospective rules could proceed without
affording such protections. If so, that perception tends to confirm that Congress expected the coun-
cils to promulgate rules.
10 See supra text accompanying note 93.
m See supra text accompanying notes 61-62 & 98. Criticism of council rules was based in
part on perceived "glaring disparities between circuits, both with regard to the specific procedures
they establish[ed] and the elements of process they cover[ed]." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4
(footnote omitted). It was, however, also based in part on the perception that council rules, "in
many instances, [were] silent on important issues." 126 CONG. REC. S13,859 (daily ed. Sept. 30,
1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
2 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13-14; see also 126 CONG. REC. S13,859 (daily ed.
Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("[The Act] would, I believe, go a long way toward
remedying the existing deficiencies in the various sets of rules now in use by the 11 judicial coun-
cils by strengthening and clarifying their power to handle complaints against members of the
Federal judiciary.").
113 See supra text accompanying note 18.
* See the analytical table, infra Appendix A.
"* For instance, pre-Act Rule E(1) of the Judicial Council of the D.C. Circuit gave to the
authorized screening authorities "full discretion as to whether the identity of a complainant shall
be disclosed to the judge complained of if a complaint is dismissed." House Hearings, supra note
24, at 455. The question is not addressed in that council's rules promulgated to implement the
Act. The same council provided guidance on the rules of evidence in its pre-Act rules, id. at 453,
but does not do so in the post-Act rules. See also infra note 188.
JUDICIAL CONDUCT
ity."' With few exceptions, the councils have declined to answer the
most important procedural questions raised by the Act, including how a
special committee appointed by a chief judge will conduct its investiga-
tion, how a judicial council will proceed after receipt of the report of a
special committee, and how a council will handle petitions for review.
1. The Benefits of Rulemaking Minimalism
There are reasons, including some good reasons, for the choice that
most councils have made not to elaborate in detail the statutory
procedure.
a. Avoidance of Inappropriate Procedural Choices
First of all, it bears stating that the legislation creates
much more of an "inquisitorial-administrative" model than
an "accusatorial-adversary" one. In this regard, the judicial
council is not to be thought of as a passive and impartial
referee; rather, the council can become the active gatherer of
evidence and can control the objectives and nature of the
inquiry.
117
The Act contemplates or will accommodate modes of proceeding that
are unfamiliar to the American bench and bar. As a result, the councils
had reason to fear that prospective rules might yield inappropriate pro-
cedural choices and reason to desire experience before undertaking gen-
eralized lawmaking." 8 After all, the greatest procedural reform in this
century, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however inspired, was in
good measure a collection of legal transplants. 19
b. Flexibility and Informality
Formalism itself may have seemed a threat, either because the
choices it might impose could undermine collegial, non-adversary reso-
lution of complaints or because it could highlight the Act's fragile
116 See infra text accompanying notes 197-242.
117 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14 (footnote omitted). In the footnote, the report states:
"The 'inquisitorial' type procedure has worked well in many of the European court systems and
there is little reason to doubt its adaptability to the proposed legislation." Id. at n.33. See also id.
at 4.
128 Cf Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co.,
263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924) ("Most [court] rules are merely a formulation of the previous practice of
the courts.").
11 See Burbank, supra note 86, at 1168 & n.657.
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compromises.
120
c. Conserving Scarce Resources
The choice not to elaborate statutory process and procedure may
have seemed attractive at the time for other reasons. It permitted the
development and promulgation of rules without a great investment of
time by overburdened federal judges and administrative staffs, and as-
sured that rules would be in place when the Act became effective. 12 '
d. Familiarity
Finally, in fashioning statutory process and procedure, Congress
drew primarily on legislative proposals that in turn reflected models
created by judges who were justifiably proud of their work. 22 For
councils already operating under such models, there was no incentive to
do more than make minor adjustments. They thought the models satis-
factory, and Congress had been so informed.' 23
2. The Costs of Rulemaking Minimalism
Such seem to be the reasons supporting, and the potential benefits
of, the choice of most councils closely to adhere to the procedural skele-
ton provided by Congress. It remains to consider the case against that
approach.
10 See supra text accompanying notes 35, 70-74; note 57; cf Second Circuit Rule 0.240)
("The adoption of this rule shall not be construed as indicating any views with respect to the
constitutionality of Title 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) or of any action taken thereunder"). Of course, elab-
orative rulemaking need not enshrine inflexible or adversary procedure. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 173-74, 177-79 & 194-95.
121 A questionnaire prepared by the author was sent to all circuit executives, and responses
were received from all circuits. The responses to a question inquiring "Who had the responsibility
to prepare the initial draft of rules in your circuit?" yield the following: Circuit Executive or
Assistant Circuit Executive 4; Circuit Executive and Council Subcommittee 1; Staff Attorney 1;
Reporters 1; Court Proctor for Rules (a federal judge) and clerk of court 1; Council Subcommittee
2; Circuit Judge 1; Chief Judge 1. The responses are on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review. The identities of the respondents are hela confidential.
For an argument that the councils' approach may prove inefficient over the long term, see
infra text accompanying note 175.
1.2 As noted supra text accompanying note 66, the basic model used by Congress was H.R.
6330, supra note 59, the Judicial Conference's bill. That bill was, in turn, informed by rules
adopted by the Ninth Circuit Council, and subsequently by the Tenth Circuit Council, in late
1978 and by the Judicial Conference's March 1979 resolution. See House Hearings, supra note
24, at 63 (statement of Judge Hunter); WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 48; Browning,
supra note 3, at 203; letter from Hon. Elmo B. Hunter to all Senators, supra note 52.
... See House Hearings, supra note 24, at 63 (statement of Judge Hunter); Browning, supra
note 3, at 203-04; see also letter from Hon. Elmo B. Hunter to all Senators, supra note 52. The
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit did not make even minor revisions in response either to the
March 1979 Judicial Conference resolution or to the Act. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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a. Procedural Innovation Forgone
The slight elaboration of the Act's procedure in most councils'
rules has failed to yield the benefits of decentralized experimentation
the prospect of which was the main justification for reposing rulemak-
ing authority in the councils in the first instance. 2' The councils did
borrow in developing their rules. Apart from the statute, however, the
only models of obvious relevance' 25 available were the sets of rules that
first appeared after the Act was passed. Those rules did not signifi-
cantly elaborate the Act's provisions. 126 In this case, borrowing impeded
procedural innovation.1
2 7
b. Public Accountability and Judicial Independence
Disserved
More important, the councils' approach entails significant costs to
the congressional goals of public accountability and judicial indepen-
dence. It would seem that the remaining "important issues"' 28 to be
addressed in council rules are to be found precisely where silence has
that effect.
(i) General Considerations
The extent to which prospective procedural rules should attempt
to anticipate and resolve problems likely to arise in the administration
of the substantive law is a question inherent in the rulemaking enter-
prise. The need for certainty and predictability in the administration of
the substantive law must be balanced against the potential consequences
of inappropriate procedural choices.' 29 In assessing the former, the
sU See supra text accompanying note 93.
125 State models seem not generally to have been considered. See supra note 82. But see
Third Circuit Rule 6(D)(iv) reporters' note.
"" The first rules to appear Ivere those of the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit, adopted
on February 10, 1981, which do not elaborate, and indeed fail to incorporate some of, the Act's
provisions. Conversations with those involved in drafting the rules for the District of Columbia
and the Eighth Circuit Councils, the next rules to appear, and for the First Circuit Council,
confirm that the Sixth Circuit Rules were used as a model. See also the analytical table, infra
Appendix A. For problems arising from the use of this model, see infra notes 148-153, 198 & 200.
To assist the reader in identifying borrowing where it occurs, the councils' rules are cited in
the order in which they were adopted.
'" This is only surprising if one thinks of the role of legal transplants in legal development,
see A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974), without also considering the particular circum-
stances confronting the councils. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
'" See supra note 111.
a2 Even as ardent an opponent of codification of the common law as James Coolidge Carter
acknowledged that some matters "should properly be made the subject of statutory enactment." J.
CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 16 (1884). With respect to court
procedure, he stated:
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availability and adequacy of alternative sources of law to provide proce-
dural direction should be considered."' In assessing the latter, it is im-
portant to take into account the process by which rules found to reflect
inappropriate choices can be amended."'
In the case of rulemaking under the Act, there were legitimate
causes of concern. The unfamiliarity of the territory, the absence of
elaborative models, and the perceived fragility of judicial independence
suggested caution. But in failing to elaborate significant aspects of the
statutory process, most of the councils appear to have given insufficient
weight to the peculiar need for certainty and predictability in this
context.
(ii) Chief Judge Action
The Act provides detailed guidance on the process for filing a com-
plaint and on the powers of the chief judge in reviewing it." 2 There is
room for elaboration, to be sure, 3 ' but rules that track the statutory
sections provide a mechanism for initial screening that is predictable
and comprehensible, prescribing the main elements of the process and
channeling the chief judge's discretion. The major area of ambiguity -
types of conduct subject to disciplinary action - is substantive and lies
beyond the councils' rulemaking power. 3
It is important that this should be regulated by written rules framed beforehand;
and yet the existence of such rules, if they have the rigidity of statutory law, be-
comes the fruitful source of mischief. Cases will continually arise not foreseen by
the framers of the written rules, and consequently inadequately provided for. The
true wisdom in relation to this subject is to deal with it in a way which affords the
advantages of statutory law without its evils; and that is to entrust it to the courts to
frame rules for its regulation.
Id. at 19 (emphasis in original); see id. at 84; see also Burbank, supra note 86, at 1044 n.124;
Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 12-13 (1942); cf. Powers, Formalism and
Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REV. 27 (1976) (analyzing various
choice of law methodologies in terms of the respective values of formalism and nonformalism).
'" For the effect on the codification movement of the appearance of secondary sources, see
Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS 9 (A.
Reppy ed. 1949).
131 See J. CARTER, supra note 129, at 19-20. In advocating a bill granting the Supreme
Court of the United States the power to make supervisory court rules of procedure in civil actions
at law, supporters emphasized speed of amendment as an advantage of such a system over legisla-
tive control of procedure. See Burbank, supra note 86, at 1077 n.268, 1162 n.632. That goal was
frustrated by changes in the bill requiring reporting to Congress. See id. at 1077 n.268, 1153-54
n.601, 1162 n.632.
See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 4; id. §§ 372(c)(2)-(3),
quoted supra note 5.
' See, e.g., the analytical table, infra Appendix A.
134 See supra text accompanying notes 75-85. "[R]ules for the conduct of proceedings under
this subsection," 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 11, does not include
rules elaborating the Act's standards of misconduct or disability. See also infra text accompanying
notes 226-30.
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(iii) Special Committee Procedure
It is at the point when a chief judge has not been able to dismiss
or close a complaint - when both public accountability and judicial
independence not only appear to be but are concerns - that the Act
ceases to provide clear guidance. After a special committee has been
appointed by, and received a copy of the complaint and related docu-
ments from, the chief judge,"3 5 the Act directs it to "conduct an investi-
gation as extensive as it considers necessary."'36 Expecting that the
councils would revise their rules in response to the Act, Congress re-
quired that those rules include provisions for written notice of an inves-
tigation to the subject of a complaint and for certain procedural rights
of both the subject of a complaint and the complainant.' 3 7 That is
what, and in most cases all that, the councils' rules do in prescribing
special committee procedure.' 8
Even with the encouragement of the House report, it is not sur-
prising that the councils did not rush to the codes of Civilians, or even
to the procedural rules of administrative agencies, for guidance in for-
mulating the procedure to be followed by special committees.' 9 Here is
where the desire to gain experience before enshrining a particular mode
is most understandable. But here also the claims of those involved and
of the public to certainty and predictability are particularly insistent.
Given the weight likely to be assigned to a special committee's re-
port by the judicial council," 0O complainants and the public have reason
to fear that, if there is to be a "whitewash,'1 4' it will occur in - and
may be impossible to expose after - an investigation by a special com-
See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 6.
13s 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(5) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 6.
137 See supra note 11; text accompanying notes 97-98 & 109.
138 See the analytical table, infra Appendix A.
139 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. For a more cynical view than that taken in
the text, see infra text accompanying note 177. C. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 107, § 16:1, at 224:
"The reason the three study groups [the American Law Institute, the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence] failed to study the agency
system [of evidence] is not that their members were familiar with it and rejected it on its merits;
the reason is that they were unfamiliar with it."
"'0 See Third Circuit Rule 7(F), which provides in pertinent part: "In deciding what action
to take in a matter presented to it under this Rule, the Judicial Council shall accord substantial
weight to the findings and recommendations of the Special Committee." The draft of the Second
Circuit Rule submitted for public comment would have required a three-quarters majority of the
Council to reject a special committee's recommendations. See 2d Circuit to Revise Rules for Com-
plaints Against Judges, N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1981, at 2, col. 4. It was deleted, and no other council's
rules address the matter. But the central position of special committees within the scheme of the
Act and considerations of efficiency both point towards considerable deference by the council. See
also Neisser, supra note 3, at 157.
141 SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 3; see also House Hearings, supra note 24, at 164
(statement of Assistant Attorney General Rosenberg).
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mittee.142 It probably is not a just criticism of council rules that they
fail to afford complainants a greater role in special committee investiga-
tions than is required by the Act.14 However, in enumerating only
statutorily required rights, which emphasize the protection of the sub-
ject of a complaint, most of the councils' rules do nothing to assure the
public that special committee investigations will be orderly, thorough,
..2 But see infra text accompanying notes 161-70 concerning the potential for abuse
presented by the Act's provisions for dismissal of a complaint, in light of the ambiguity of the
substantive standards, the unavailability of orders of dismissal for public scrutiny, and the finality
of council action on petitions for review.
"" In explaining the provision that, after amendment by the Senate, became 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c)(1 1) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 11, the House report emphasized that, notwith-
standing the mandatory procedural protections required in council rules, the paragraph:
should not be read to mandate the utilization of adversary procedures by the judicial
councils or the Judicial Conference. It clearly is not the intent of the legislation to
place an individual judge or magistrate in the position of being a defendant in an
adversary proceeding before a panel of his or her colleagues.
Thus, although the legislation does not inflexibly preclude this in all cases,
there is no statutory requirement that the complainant be granted all the same
rights as the accused judicial officer. Thus, for example, the legislation does not
provide the complainant with a hearing of right, or for the opportunity to crossex-
amine witnesses.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14. The report went on to defend "[t]his imbalance of rights"
against a charge of unfairness by distinguishing between "inquisitorial-administrative" and "accu-
satorial-adversary" models. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 117. A Senate amendment ad-
ded § 372(c)(1 1)(C). See supra text accompanying note 99.
Only the Third Circuit Judicial Council has elaborated the statute in this aspect. Third
Circuit Rule 6(B)(ii) provides:
(B) Notice and Opportunity to Appear or Present Argument.
(ii) Complainant. During the Special Committee's investigation, the com-
plainant shall be afforded an opportunity to present argument in writing.
The complainant shall also be afforded an opportunity to appear at proceed-
ings conducted by the Special Committee, and to exercise one or more of the
rights conferred by Rules 6(B)(i) and 6(C), if the Special Committee con-
cludes that the complainant could thereby offer substantial additional infor-
mation or assistance. In such event, the Special Committee may, if the cr-
cumstances so require, allow the complainant to be accompanied by counsel.
The reporters' note explains:
Rule 6(B)(ii) tracks and expands upon 28 U.S.C. §372(c)(11)(C). The com-
plainant has not been given an absolute right to appear, because it is doubtful that
such a right would be consistent with the Act (see 126 Cong. Rec. S13861 (daily ed.
Sept. 30, 1980) and id. H10191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980), and because it is not
deemed necessary to protect the interests of the complainant or of the system of
justice. If the Special Committee decides that the complainant should be permitted
to appear, it should also have discretion to permit the complainant to exercise any
of the rights enumerated in Rules 6(B)(i) and 6(C). Where the Special Committee
decides that an appearance by the complainant would not contribute "substantial
additional information," the opportunity to present argument in writing may be
perceived, at least by those unfamiliar with the "inquisitorial-administrative"
model, as an important means of ensuring that the Special Committee has and con-
siders all relevant information. The provision regarding counsel accompanying a
complainant is taken from 126 Cong. Rec. S13861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980).
Third Circuit Rule 6(B)(ii) reporters' note.
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and fair.1 44 Moreover, alternative sources do not currently provide such
assurance. Complainants are likely to be excluded from most if not all
aspects of a special committee's investigation.1 45 In most circuits, a com-
mittee's findings and recommendations apparently are confidential, and
its report is not required to describe the committee's procedure.1 46 It is
questionable whether council orders will meet the need, for although
required to be publicly available, such orders will not typically be pub-
lished. Even if the orders are published, and although required to in-
clude written reasons, they may not set out in any detail the procedure
followed by special committees or the councils. Finally, the experience
to date suggests that it may be a long time before there will be enough
experience with special committee investigations to develop, let alone
publicize, what might be called a common law procedure. 47
To federal judges concerned about their independence, a special
"' But see President's Statement on Signing S. 1873 into Law, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOc. 2239-40 (Oct. 15, 1980):
At the same time, the legislation creates uniform, known procedures for dealing
with an unfit judge. Citizens can be confident that a complaint filed under this
system will receive fair and serious attention throughout the process. For all these
reasons the new process should increase public confidence in the quality of the Fed-
eral judiciary.
145 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
146 The Act requires a special committee to file with the council "a comprehensive written
report . . . present[ing] both the findings of the investigation and the committee's recommenda-
tions." 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(5) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 6. Unlike the-written orders of a
council acting on a special committee's report, the report itself need not be made available to the
public. See id. § 372(c)(15), quoted supra note 104. Nor is there any requirement that a copy be
furnished to the complainant or the subject of the complaint. Only the Third Circuit Judicial
Council has so provided by rule. See Third Circuit Rule 6(F). The reporters' note explains:
Rule 6(F) is not required by the Act. It can be argued that, since the Special
Committee simply advises the Judicial Council, transmittal is neither necessary nor
appropriate. However, particularly in light of the provision in Rule 7(F) regarding
the weight to be given the Special Committee's report, knowledge of the contents of
the report would appear important to both the judge or magistrate whose conduct is
the subject of the complaint and the complainant in determining whether to petition
the Judicial Conference for review of an action of the Judicial Council. In addition,
transmittal to the complainant may further the goal of accountability.
The Rule provides that the report will be transmitted subject to a confidential-
ity order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14). See Rule 10(J). Copies of the report
should be marked "Confidential."
Third Circuit Rule 6(F) reporters' note.
1'7 For the statutory requirements regarding council orders, see supra note 104. The Judicial
Council of the Ninth Circuit has published certain orders. See In re Charge of Judicial Miscon-
duct, 685 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. Judicial Council 1982) (review petition dismissed). For pre-Act
published dispositions, all dismissals by the Chief Judge, see In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct,
613 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1980) (Browning, C.J.); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 595 F.2d
517 (9th Cir. 1979) (Browning, C.J.); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 593 F.2d 879 (9th
Cir. 1979) (Browning, C.J.). For subsequent dispositions to be published, see In re Charge of
Judicial Misconduct, No. 82-8114 (9th Cir. Oct. 29, 1982) (Wright, J.); In re Charge of Judicial
Misconduct, No. 82-8059 (9th Cir. Judicial Council Nov. 1, 1982) (review petition dismissed).
For another means of dissemination of procedure, see infra text accompanying note 150. For
experience to date, see infra note 257.
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committee investigation is also a major focus of concern, which is why
Congress, following the Conference's proposal, required that the subject
of a complaint be afforded certain procedural rights at "proceedings
conducted by" the committee.148 Those rights tend to assure that a spe-
cial committee's findings and recommendations will not be arbitrary.
The question is whether they go far enough and whether uncertainty in
that regard well serves the policy of preserving judicial independence.
In most circuits, a judge or magistrate who is the subject of a com-
plaint will not know how, if the complaint is referred to a special com-
mittee, the committee's investigation will proceed, whether and when
access to any investigative file will be afforded, at what stage in the
committee's investigation procedural rights may be exercised, the nature
of "proceedings" conducted by the committee (including the order of
proof, the rules of evidence, and the method of presenting and obtaining
rulings on objections), whether a transcript of the "proceedings" will be
available, or the information that may be considered by the committee
in preparing its findings and recommendations for the judicial
council.1 49
In short, the subject of a complaint has no assurance that the exer-
cise of procedural rights holds the promise of affecting the findings and
recommendations of the special committee. Such information could be
148 See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11)(B) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 11; supra note 96 and
accompanying text. The word "proceedings" as used in this section is not defined in the Act or its
legislative history. Third Circuit Rule I(E) defines the word as meaning "any meeting of a special
committee ... or of the Judicial Council at which record evidence is taken." Third Circuit Rule
1(E) reporters' note observes:
Rule 1(E) is also new. "Proceedings" is necessarily a narrower concept than
"investigation" if an "inquisitorial-administrative" model of the sort contemplated
by Congress is to be implemented. See H.R. Rep. 96-1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1980) .... As pointed out in the Note to Rule 6(B)(i), an investigation may go
forward without the participation of the judge or magistrate whose conduct is the
subject of a complaint. However, although the Judicial Council and any Special
Committee have authority to conduct broad investigations (see 28 U.S.C.
§§ 372(c)(5) and (6) and Rules 6(A) and 7(A)), under these Rules no dispositive
action by either of those entities can be based on anything other than record evi-
dence taken at "proceedings," and the judge or magistrate has procedural rights in
connection with the taking of such evidence. See Rules 6(B)(i), 6(E), 7(C)(i) and
7(F).
The failure of some councils' rules to distinguish between "proceedings" and "investigation"
leaves unclear whether under those rules a special committee has the option to file a report with-
out conducting "proceedings," an interpretation evidently foreclosed by the legislative history, see
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14, or whether the subject of a complaint can insist on exercis-
ing the procedural rights conferred at any stage of a special committee's investigation. The latter
interpretation also seems inconsistent with the legislative history. See id.; supra note 120 and
accompanying text. But see 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1 1) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 11 (sug-
gesting a broad interpretation of "proceedings"). For rules that present this problem, see, e.g.,
Sixth Circuit Rules 6 & 10; Eighth Circuit Rules 5 & 9; First Circuit Rules 7 & 11. For the
influence of borrowing, see supra note 126.
'"' See the analytical table, infra Appendix A.
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provided by memorandum at the start of an investigation.1 50 But to be
disseminated, procedure must exist. In any event, whatever assurance
an individual judge involved in the process receives from a memoran-
dum is unlikely to benefit other judges in the circuit. That may be
reason enough not to engage in conduct that could be made the subject
of a colorable complaint, quite a chill when one recalls the Act's sub-
stantive ambiguity.1 51
(iv) Judicial Council Procedure
The Act has been widely interpreted to say even less about the
procedure to be followed by a judicial council after receipt of the report
of a special committee. A council is empowered to conduct "any addi-
tional investigation which it considers to be necessary, ' 152 and it must
provide written notice of such an investigation to the subject of the com-
plaint. 15' Believing that they were under no other specific con-
straints,'" but concomitantly lacking any other statutory provisions to
150 One respondent to the author's questionnaire, supra note 121, observed that the answers
to a number of questions of interpretation regarding that council's rules had not been reflected in
amendments to those rules but rather in "changes in our own internal operating procedures."
Moreover, it was said that "in those infrequent instances, where appropriate, judges or other
persons involved in a proceeding will be informed of these procedures by memorandum." In a
subsequent telephone conversation, this respondent observed that the advisability of amending the
council's rules was under consideration.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 82-85; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 18-
19; 126 CONG. REC. S13,864 (daily ed. September 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 7.
" 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11)(A) (Supp. V 1981) ("adequate prior notice of any investiga-
tion"), quoted supra note 11. Failure to recognize the applicability of this requirement to council
investigations is common among the councils' rules. See, e.g., Fifth Circuit Rule 24.2; see also
Ninth Circuit Rules 5 & 6; Third Circuit Rules 6 & 7; Eleventh Circuit Rules 5 & 6. Equally
common is the failure to include in council rules any reference to the statutory requirement of
notice of an investigation (that is, even in connection with a special committee investigation). See
Sixth Circuit Rules 6 & 8; D.C. Circuit Rules 5 & 6; Eighth Circuit Rules 5 & 7; First Circuit
Rules 7 & 9. It may be that, as applied to special committees, the requirement was deemed
redundant in light of the Act's provision for written notice upon appointment of such a committee.
See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4)(C) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 6; D.C. Circuit Rule 4(C); First
Circuit Rule 7. But note that neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Eighth Circuit provides for such
notice in its rules. See the analytical table, infra Appendix A. For the influence of borrowing, see
supra note 126.
154 It should be noted, however, that the discussion of the "inquisitorial-administrative"
model and of "the potential excesses of a circuit council" in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14,
quoted supra note 96, is fully as applicable to council investigations as it is to special committee
investigations. Cf supra note 153 (notice of investigation required at both stages). Nonetheless, the
rights enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 372(c)(11)(B) & (C) (Supp. V 1981), have been thought by
many to be mandatory only in connection with council rules governing special committee investi-
gations. This presumably is why there is no relevant provision concerning council procedure in the
rules of the Judicial Councils of the District of Columbia, Ninth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.
See the analytical table, infra Appendix A; see also Third Circuit Rule 7(C)(i) reporters' note.
The strongest support for this view is the linkage in the floor remarks of the Act's managers
between the words "investigating panel" and a special committee of the council. See 126 CONG.
REC. S13,861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("The investigating panel
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incorporate in their rules, many councils responded by determining the
extent to which statutory procedural rights before a special committee
were applicable before the council. Other councils, however, did not
even go that far, presumably leaving the matter discretionary.
155
Notwithstanding the central position of a special committee inves-
tigation to the scheme of self-regulation contemplated by the Act,
within the decentralized structure of the circuits, only a council has the
power to take formal action to remedy problems of misconduct or disa-
bility, and any action it takes must be public.156 For those reasons,
complainants, the subjects of complaints, and the public have a legiti-
mate claim to knowledge of council procedure. And again, the councils
have not provided adequate sources of procedural information to sup-
plement council rules.
The rules of many councils may lead those who distrust self-regu-
referred to here is likely to be one appointed by a circuit council pursuant to paragraph (4) of the
proposed legislation."); id. at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier);
see also Third Circuit Rule 1 reporters' note.
If one were to take the view suggested by HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14 - that
council rules must afford the subject of a complaint and the complainant the rights set forth in
§§ 372(c)(11)(B) & (C) in council investigations as well as in special committee investigations -
the major concern would be one of efficiency. Unlike a special committee, however, the council
need not undertake an investigation. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(5) (Supp. V 1981) with id.
§ 372(c)(6)(A). On the other hand, it would be difficult to maintain that, once having determined
to conduct an additional investigation, a council could deny a judge or magistrate the right to the
exercise of his or her rights "at proceedings conducted by the investigating panel." See supra note
148. But cf. Sixth Circuit Rules 8 & 10; Eighth Circuit Rules 7 & 9; First Circuit Rules 9 & 11,
which may take the position that, if a council rejects or closes the complaint, any error is harmless.
One way to avoid this interpretive difficulty and the problems of inefficiency adumbrated here
is for the council to remand to a special committee for any additional investigation. See Third
Circuit Rule 7(B)(ii). Alternatively, the council could conduct "proceedings" through a committee
of less than the whole ("the investigating panel"). Cf. 126 CONG. REC. S13,861 (daily ed. Sept.
30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (contemplating use of "investigating panel" other than
the standing committee by the Judicial Conference); id. at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (state-
ment of Rep. Kastenmeier) (same); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 11 (investigative assistance).
Note, however, that no council treating council procedure has so provided. See infra note 157.
'" The councils' actions are summarized in Third Circuit Rule 7(C)(i) reporters' note, as
follows:
The Rules of a number of Judicial Councils do not specifically treat the issue
of the right of a judge or magistrate to present evidence at the Judicial Council
stage, thereby leaving it to discretion on a case-by-case basis. Fourth Circuit Rules
5(B) and 6(A) afford the judge or magistrate an absolute right to present evidence
before the Judicial Council if it conducts additional investigation. Sixth Circuit
Rules 8 and 10, Eighth Circuit Rules 7 and 9 and First Circuit Rules 9 and 11
grant a similar right unless the Council rejects or doses the complaint. Paragraph
(d) of the Second Circuit Rule affords the same rights to a judge or magistrate (and
to a complainant) in any investigation by the Judicial Council as are afforded in an
investigation by a Special Committee, "provided that the circuit council may ex-
clude matters which duplicate unnecessarily matters raised before the Committee."
See also the analytical table, infra Appendix A.
'" But see infra note 218 and accompanying text, where problems in the interpretation of
§ 372(c)(15) are discussed. It should also be recalled that the Judicial Conference has the power
to grant petitions for review. See supra note 85.
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lation in this area to fear that the subject of a complaint can, by a one-
sided presentation of evidence157 or simply by insisting on procedural
rights accorded by a council,15 induce it not to follow, or to modify,
adverse findings and recommendations of a special committee. Council
rules that do not elaborate at all the statutorily prescribed procedure
are even less likely to inspire public confidence.
The subject of a complaint, on the other hand, is more likely to be
concerned that the council will decline to follow the favorable findings
and recommendations of a special committee or will increase the sanc-
tion recommended in an adverse report. The rules of some councils pro-
vide safeguards against arbitrary action,15 although the silence of most
on the weight to be accorded a special committee's findings and recom-
mendations160 may diminish their value. Council rules that do not pro-
vide even those safeguards are inadequate from the perspective of judi-
cial independence.
(v) Review Petitions
Finally, the Act provides that "[a] complainant, judge, or magis-
trate aggrieved by a final order of the chief judge may petition the
judicial council for review." ' 1 The Act speaks not at all to the powers
of, or the procedure to be followed by, a judicial council in considering
petitions for review. This may explain why Congress, adopting the
Conference's language, specifically referred to "the processing of peti-
... This might not be a concern if, in undertaking additional investigation, the council were
to play the "inquisitorial-administrative" role envisioned in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 14,
quoted supra text accompanying note 117. But see supra text accompanying notes 140-44. Where,
as in the Fourth Circuit, provision is only made for the subject of the complaint to appear before
the council, that possibility seems remote. See Fourth Circuit Rule 6(A). More generally, in light
of the failure of any of the councils' rules to provide that the council may conduct "proceedings"
through a committee of less than the whole, an active investigative role for the council seems
unrealistic. See supra note 154. Thus, both efficiency concerns and the desire to give the subject of
a complaint the right to be heard may skew investigations at this stage.
558 The costs of "proceedings" before the full council do not require elaboration. They are
such as to furnish a strong argument against interpreting §§ 372 (c)(11)(B) & (C) as applicable
at this stage, see supra note 154, and they may deter councils from undertaking additional investi-
gation, if that is effectively the trigger for the exercise of the rights of the subject of a complaint in
council rules.
... See supra note 155. As to the adequacy of the safeguards, cf. supra text accompanying
notes 148-51 (special committee procedure).
180 See supra note 140, where it is argued, however, that a special committee's findings and
recommendations should be accorded substantial weight by the council.
Moreover, the safeguards have no value, and the weight to be accorded the report of a special
committee assumes particular importance, in cases where a council is not inclined to conduct addi-
tional investigation and, in such circumstances, is not required by its rules to afford any rights to
the subject of a complaint. See supra note 155. Consider, for example, a council accepting the
findings of a special committee but increasing the recommended sanction.
161 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 9.
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tions for review" in its grant of rulemaking authority. 16 2 Almost all
councils have, except with respect to minor matters, declined Congress's
invitation.163 The general considerations suggesting that silence is de-
structive of the goals of public accountability and judicial independence
should by now be clear. It remains to indicate the specific respects in
which they are implicated.
Both the state and the pre-Act federal experience provided a basis
for prediction that most complaints filed under the Act would be dis-
missed by the chief judges."6 " Reported dispositions to date confirm the
prediction.'6 5 The public has no way of knowing, however, whether the
prophecy is self-fulfilling or whether a judicial discipline mechanism is
a magnet for frivolous or immaterial complaints. The problem of evalu-
ating complaint dismissals is exacerbated by the Act's substantive ambi-
guity, the unavailability to the public of dismissal orders and council
orders disposing of petitions for review, and the finality of council ac-
tion on such petitions.'66 In these circumstances, the review process as-
" Id. § 372(c)(1 1), quoted supra note 11; see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
163 See the analytical table, infra Appendix A. As indicated there, the exception can be found
in Third Circuit Rule 9. The Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit has approved a provision that
requires the most senior member of that body (other than the chief judge) to evaluate petitions for
review and report on them to the council. It has not, however, approved the final wording of the
provision or its location in the council's rules. Telephone interview with Kathleen D. Freeman,
law clerk to Chief Judge Browning (Apr. 28, 1983).
164 See House Hearings, supra note 24, at 98 (statement of Chief Judge Browning); id. at
161 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Rosenberg); I. TSITOR, JUDICIAL CONDUCT OR-
GANIZATIONS 7 (1978), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 741; see also TESITOR &
SINKS, supra note 27, at 50; Browning, supra note 3, at 203-04.
165 See Appendix B; infra note 257.
I" There is no requirement that either a chief judge's order dismissing or closing a complaint
or a council's order disposing of a petition for review be made publicly available. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c)(15) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 104; supra notes 146 & 147. Although such
orders have been published in the Ninth Circuit, see supra note 147, one respondent to the au-
thor's questionnaire, see supra note 121, observed that the council in question, "upon considering
the procedures of other circuits . . . decided to treat as confidential a chief judge's order of dismis-
sal." It is only if a council were to grant a petition for review and order action under
§ 372(c)(6)(B) that the order would come within the terms of § 372(c)(15). But such action
would be inconsistent with the scheme contemplated by § 372(c)(6). See Third Circuit Rule 9(G)
reporters' note. This is not to advocate publishing such orders, at least if they contain the names of
the subjects of complaint. See infra notes 169 & 217. The orders of the Ninth Circuit Council do
not identify the persons against whom complaints were filed.
For the Act's substantive ambiguity, see supra text accompanying notes 82-85, 151.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (Supp. V 1981) provides that "[a] complainant, judge, or magistrate
aggrieved by an action of the judicial council under paragraph (6) of this subsection may petition
the Judicial Conference of the United States for review thereof." Because, except perhaps as sug-
gested supra, action of a council on a petition for review is not "action . . . under paragraph (6)
of this subsection," council action on review petitions is final. This interpretation, which is linguis-
tically compelled, finds further support in the last sentence of § 372(c)(10): "Except as expressly
provided in this paragraph, all orders and determinations, including denials of petitions for review,
shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise." See
also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13. Nothing in the legislative history of the Senate's
amendment of this section is to the contrary. See sources cited supra note 99. Indeed, review by the
Judicial Conference would entail one of the evils alleged on behalf of the Conference with respect
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sumes particular importance. In most circuits complainants and the
public lack assurance that a chief judge will not participate in decisions
on petitions for review and knowledge of the information that will be
considered by the council.187 They are required to accept on faith that
informality and collegiality will not lead to ad hoc manipulation.
For the subject of a complaint no less than for a complainant and
the public, the Act's substantive ambiguity and the finality of council
action impart special importance to the procedure and powers of the
judicial council in acting on petitions for review. Judges (and magis-
trates) are not likely to initiate a petition for review,"'8 but they are
vitally interested in the disposition of a petition filed by a complainant.
Dismissal not only permits the subjects of complaints to avoid the anxi-
ety, expense, and diversion of judicial energy that attend a special com-
mittee investigation; it also protects their good names and permits them
to continue doing their share of the other things judges do.169 Silence on
such questions as the right to file a response to a petition for review
holds the prospect of harassment and consequently is a threat to judi-
cial independence. Moreover, silence is difficult to defend by a need to
gain experience. Indeed, that concern is of little or no legitimate force
in any aspect of the petition process, for which models of obvious rele-
to S. 1873 as passed in the Senate. See supra note 76. For experience to date, see infra note 265.
17 See the analytical table, infra Appendix A. One respondent to the author's questionnaire,
supra note 121, noted that "after canvassing the other circuits, we developed internal procedures
for the council's handling of petitions for review of dismissal orders by the chief judge and, in
particular, determined that the chief judge could participate in the council's consideration of such
petitions for review." But see Third Circuit Rule 9(H); cf. Neisser, supra note 3, at 159-60
(participation in Judicial Conference review of council action by chief judge or district court
representative).
IU It is unlikely that judges or magistrates will exercise their right to petition
for review because the powers of the chief judge under paragraph (3) are
limited to dismissing the complaint or concluding the proceeding if corrective
action has been taken.
Nonetheless, to preserve equal treatment between the parties in the
process, the right to petition for review of the chief judge's actions to the
circuit council is provided to all the individuals involved in the proceedings.
126 CONG. REC. S13,860 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); see also id. at
H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
1.. There is no requirement that a council order dismissing a petition for review be made
publicly available. See supra note 166. And if published, it need not identify the subject of the
complaint. See id. Confidentiality serves a judge's interest as well as the "public interest in avoid-
ing publicity for unfounded charges." WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 62, reprinted in
House Hearings, supra note 24, at 682. In addition, the subject of a complaint dismissed by a
chief judge is not "the subject of an investigation" and is therefore not disqualified from serving
"upon a special committee. . . upon a judicial council, upon the Judicial Conference, or upon the
standing committee established under section 331 of this title, until all related proceedings under
this subsection have been finally terminated." 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(12) (Supp. V 1981). See Third
Circuit Rule 10(G); Neisser, supra note 3, at 158. For an account of judges' nonjudicial roles
more generally, see Schwartz, The Other Things That Courts Do, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 438
(1981).
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vance are available.
1 70
3. The Benefits of Rulemaking Minimalism Reconsidered
The costs of rulemaking minimalism are such that the councils'
choice is difficult to support. The main argument for that approach -
that elaborative local rulemaking will produce inappropriate procedural
choices - is simply inapplicable to some matters of procedure under
the Act.1"' Moreover it is easy to exaggerate the risks of elaborative
rulemaking under the Act. Although some of the possible procedural
choices may be unfamiliar, the substantive interests to be served have
been defined in a full legislative record. Compared to the problem of
foreseeability posed by trans-substantive rules such as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 172 the councils' problem appears trivial. Or at
least it does once it is recalled that there is a middle ground between no
detail and too much detail, that creeds and catalogues do not exhaust
rulemaking alternatives. 1 7 Due attention to Congress's purposes and
goals suggests that some choices must be made, but they need not de-
prive special committees or the councils of flexibility to adjust their pro-
cedure to the needs of individual cases.
1 7 4
Moreover, the case for the councils' minimalism fails to take ac-
count of the relative speed with which council rules can be amended. If
for some reason a rulemaking choice has proved unfortunate, the mat-
ter can be attended to at the next scheduled meeting of the council or, if
the consideration of pending complaints suggests urgency, by other
means.
1 75
The argument of prematurity also neglects the fact that, in the
absence of adequate alternative sources of procedural information, skel-
etal rulemaking promotes inefficiency as well as uncertainty. The temp-
170 See Third Circuit Rule 9(J) reporters' note; c. 126 CONG. REC. S13,860-61 (daily ed.
Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (suggesting Supreme Court's certiorari practice as
model for Judicial Conference); id. at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
7 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 170.
172 See Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE LJ. 718 (1975).
173 "In short, to use Professor Maguire's phrase, the choice is between a catalogue, a creed,
and a Code. The Institute decided in favor of a Code." Morgan, supra note 129, at 13.
'" See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 107, § 8.7 (2d ed. 1979). "Those who prefer discretion to
rules on particular subjects are often victims of the widespread misimpression that rules are neces-
sarily inconsistent with discretion; guiding rules and rules with escape clauses are not inconsistent
with discretion." Id. at 186 (emphasis in original); see also infra text accompanying note 195.
17 Each judicial council is required to meet "at least twice in each year." 28 U.S.C.
§ 33 2 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The council can, of course, take action more often, including, pre-
sumably, by conference call, mail, or other similar means not requiring travel. Thus, rulemaking
under the Act does not confront the problem of long delays that has beset supervisory court
rulemaking. See Burbank, supra note 86, at 1020 n.10, 1153-54 n.601; supra note 131.
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tation for the councils to invest as little of their judicial and administra-
tive resources as possible in the elaboration of the Act remains strong in
light of the press of other business and the fate of most complaints. But
colorable complaints will come, and when they do, lacking direction
from the council, special committees will be forced to make up proce-
dure as they go along. Some of the procedural rules thus developed,
because they are not authoritative and because the whole process is un-
familiar, are likely to be challenged, delaying the final resolution of a
complaint. 1 6 Even when the procedural issues in a case have been set-
tled by the council or the Judicial Conference, on this hypothesis there
is no way to prevent future challenges.
It is not difficult to imagine the types of challenges that those in-
volved in the process will make to procedure developed by special com-
mittees in the absence of prospective rules. The adversary system is all
that most American lawyers know, and for that reason alone, they
think it best.177 In opting for Congress's confusing creed, which imports
aspects of traditional adversary procedure, the councils have increased
the probability that the model that Congress, in response to judicial
importunings, sought to avoid17 8 will in fact predominate. Ironically in
light of one suggested reason for the councils' aversion to elaborative
rulemaking, formalism is the cure for and not the cause of adherence to
the adversary way.
7119
176 Moreover, such delay would implicate concerns for judicial independence.
17 Whoever first characterized the continental European system as "inquisitorial" did
a profound disservice to constructive legal thought. Substitute "inquiring" and the
bad becomes the good. The adversary system is not the only way to the truth; in-
deed, it has too often been a game in which both sides vie in their efforts to obscure
the truth. Hopefully, by the year 2000, we will have learned where to preserve the
adversary system and where to substitute something else.
Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, second
phase, vol. I, at 205 (1974) (statement of Judge Friendly), quoted in Remington, supra note 3, at
728 n.172. This attitude was reflected in comments received on a published draft of the Third
Circuit Rules. Many of those submitting comments resisted any departure from the adversary
model, even though such departures were authorized, indeed encouraged, by Congress. See supra
text accompanying note 117.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
27 See supra text accompanying note 120.
The discussion thus far may well suggest the question, Why all this care in
developing rules of some dynamic content, but susceptible to misinterpretation,
whereas a simpler course would be to commit complete discretion to the trial court?
The answer is very clear that, without a tradition for the exercise of discretion, a
general grant of power is likely to accomplish little. Habitually courts act according
to precept and custom. If left to their own devices, without any precise guide beyond
a general authorization, they will stick to what they have known in the past. One of
the most difficult problems in procedure is to develop a rule sufficiently complex to
suggest the various applications to which it is susceptible and yet sufficiently flex-
ible not to restrict. ...
Clark, supra note 107, at 501.
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B. Disuniformity
Local experimentation is bound to result in some national dis-
uniformity. In empowering the Judicial Conference to modify council
rules, Congress sought to ensure uniformity on aspects of procedure, in
addition to those statutorily prescribed, as to which the benefits of con-
tinuing experimentation do not justify its costs.1 80 But Congress also
had evidence of the judicial councils' preference for rulemaking
minimalism, of "glaring disparities between circuits" with regard to
"the elements of the process they cover[ed]" as well as to "the specific
procedures they establish[ed." 81 For the Judicial Conference, the si-
lence of most councils' rules on important aspects of procedure is the
greatest challenge to the exercise of its statutory powers.
1. Disuniformity from Conflict in Council Rules
Consider first those few matters of procedure not covered by the
Act on which either enough councils have spoken to create certain dis-
uniformity or the combination of council rules and council silence ren-
ders disuniformity probable.
a. No Need for Uniformity: Benefits and No Costs in
Continuing Experimentation
In some instances the potential benefits of continuing experimenta-
tion are so obvious, and the costs arising from disuniformity so specula-
tive, that requiring a uniform rule would be premature. For instance,
led by the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit, three councils provide
for a bankruptcy judge or magistrate to join a special committee in an
advisory capacity in investigations involving one of their colleagues. 8 '
80 See supra text accompanying notes 92-98. In commenting on the councils' post-March
1979 rules, Attorney General Civiletti observed:
There is such disparity among the procedural rules that, in the Justice Depart-
ment's view, they are likely to produce unexplained inconsistencies in the way dif-
ferent circuits treat similar types of complaints. . . .A major purpose of a mecha-
nism for handling complaints against judges is to enhance the prestige and efficacy
of the judiciary as a whole by assuring the public that judges are persons of integ-
rity and ability. Procedures that are incompletely defined and that treat judges in-
consistently cannot be expected to enhance public confidence in the judicial system
and may even diminish it.
Remarks of Attorney General Civiletti, Annual Dinner in Honor of the Judiciary, ABA Judicial
Administration Division (Aug. 4, 1980).
One should add complainants to judges in considering the costs of inconsistent treatment. See
also House Hearings, supra note 24, at 161 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Rosenberg).
181 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4; see also supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
s See Ninth Circuit Rule 4(a); Third Circuit Rule 5(B); Eleventh Circuit Rule 4(b).
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Persuaded by the experience in these circuits, other councils may
choose to amend their rules, but it is difficult to maintain that they
should be required to do so.
b. Uniformity Needed: Costs and No Benefits
in Continuing Experimentation
In other instances, continuing experimentation by the councils au-
gurs no benefits, and the costs of disuniformity are sufficient to suggest
the wisdom of a uniform rule. Six councils impose time limits on filing
petitions for review from the action of the chief judge.18 Here it is the
existence, and not the content, of a rule that is most important.'" For
that reason, what should be said to a complainant in the Second or
Seventh Circuit whose petition for review, filed twenty-nine days after
entry of the chief judge's order, has been dismissed as untimely and
who discovers that the petition would have been timely in the Third,
Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits? 8 5 Where legal rules are essen-
tially arbitrary and cannot even be defended on grounds of sovereign or
institutional integrity, one who suffers their consequences is quick to
sense inequitable administration of the law. 8 6 In this context, such a
perception is harmful to the goal of public accountability.
c. The Problem of Unverifiable Benefits
In still other instances, it is difficult to determine whether the ben-
efits of continuing experimentation exceed the costs of disuniformity to
the goals of public accountability and judicial independence. Five coun-
cils require that a complaint be verified under oath or signed subject to
the penalties for perjury.18 Silence in the rules of the others presuma-
bly signals the lack of any such requirement. Assuming the councils
have free choice on the matter, 88 it is conceivable, although not likely,
183 See Ninth Circuit Rule 8 (30 days); Second Circuit Rule 0.24(b) (20 days); Fourth Cir-
cuit Rule 8 (30 days); Seventh Circuit Rule 10 (20 days); Third Circuit Rule-9(B) (30 days);
Eleventh Circuit Rule 8 (30 days). These rules are discussed further, from a different perspective,
infra text accompanying notes 230-33.
' See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1960).
" In addition, a complainant may wonder if there is any time limit on petitions for review
in the six circuits that have not so prescribed by rule.
... Cf. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980) (refusing to displace state
tolling rule in the absence of a pertinent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure).
137 See Second Circuit Rule 0.24(a); Third Circuit Rule 2(B); Fifth Circuit Rule 24.1; Elev-
enth Circuit Rule 1; Eighth Circuit Rule 1. There are differences among these rules, although the
potential consequences of willful misstatement appear to be functionally indistinguishable. See
Third Circuit Rule 2(B) reporters' note. The Eighth Circuit provision results from an amendment
on May 17, 1982.
'" Pre-Act Rule A(l) of the D.C. Circuit, see House Hearings, supra note 24, at 451, and
the pre-Act procedures of the Fifth Circuit, see id. at 413, contained such a requirement. The
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that experience could replace reason on the question whether the re-
quirement in fact deters unfounded complaints, the main argument ad-
duced in its favor.1 89 In the meanwhile, however, an informed public
will know only that some councils have not deemed an oath or its statu-
tory equivalent necessary to protect judicial independence or judicial
resources and thus may regard the requirement as calculated to deter
meritorious complaints or as having that effect. Given plausible argu-
ments on both sides, and unless there is a reasonable possibility that
continuing experimentation will yield informative data, uniformity is
more important than the choice it imposes. The calculus is equally dif-
ficult with respect to the issue of anonymous complaints, which are ef-
fectively forbidden in seven circuits but may be permitted in the
others.190
assumption that councils have free choice is reasonable from the perspective of rulemaking author-
ity under the Act. See Third Circuit Rule 2(B) reporters' note. It should be noted, however, that
such a requirement was included in S. 1423, supra note 29 (the Nunn/DeConcini bill passed by
the Senate in 1978) and in S. 295, supra note 35 (the identical bill introduced in 1979).
The Committee on the Judiciary believes that the requirement that complaints
be written and verified or subscribed in the manner prescribed in section 1746 of
title 28, United States Code, will tend to reduce the number of frivolous actions
filed and if intentional falsehoods are found in a complaint, a conviction based upon
a charge of perjury may result.
. . . If a complainant is unwilling to swear that the statements are "true and
correct" to the best of his knowledge, no member of the judiciary should be sub-
jected to the investigation procedures ....
S. REP. No. 1035, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978).
S. 522, supra note 42, introduced by Senator Bayh, contained, in a proposed amendment
adding § 332(g)(1), the requirement that each complaint be "in writing and. . . accompanied by
supporting affidavits." Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 163. Judge Hunter approved of this
provision, which he interpreted as requiring "the swearing of the complaint." Id. at 29. But Chief
Justice Cameron of Arizona criticized the requirement in S. 295 as "unnecessary," noting that the
proposed commission would investigate many matters brought to its attention by newspapers or
anonymous complaints. See id. at 91; see also id. at 94-95; infra note 190.
"0 See supra note 188. In fact, given the existence of so many other variables likely to affect
the number of complaints filed in a circuit, empirical testing of the hypothesis would be difficult if
not impossible.
190 See Ninth Circuit Rule 1; Second Circuit Rule 0.24(a); Fourth Circuit Rule 1; Third
Circuit Rule 2(B); Fifth Circuit Rule 24.1; Eleventh Circuit Rule 1; Eighth Circuit Rule 1; see
also Third Circuit Rule 2(B) reporters' note. The Eighth Circuit provision results from an
amendment on May 17, 1982. It is, of course, not clear that silence on the matter in the rules of
other judicial councils signifies a willingness to accept anonymous complaints.
At some point in complaint processing, fairness to the subject of a complaint may require
disclosure of the name of the complainant, the perception that probably animated pre-Act Rule
E(1) of the D.C. Circuit, discussed supra note 115. An argument for receiving anonymous com-
plaints was made at the Senate hearings by Chief Justice Cameron of Arizona:
As a practical matter, the really serious matters that [state] commissions get are
usually anonymous. The reason I think is apparent, because the people most likely
to know of a serious complaint are part of the courthouse staff or they are attor-
neys. I would submit to you that no matter how brave a person may be or how
supportive of our system he may be, he really is not going to rush out and put his
name on a complaint, particularly when he may have some feeling that the com-
plaint may not be acted upon promptly.
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d. Uniformity to Protect Experimentation
Finally, there are instances in which a uniform rule may serve to
ensure the councils' ability to experiment. Three of the councils address
the question of the rules of evidence to be applied at proceedings con-
ducted by special committees or by the councils. The First Circuit pro-
vides that "[t]he proceedings will be guided by but not bound by the
Federal Rules of Evidence."1"1 The Third Circuit rules state that
"[e]xcept where inappropriate, the provisions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence shall govern proceedings." '92 The Second Circuit, on the
other hand, affords a right to the subject of a complaint to require that
the Federal Rules of Evidence apply.1"'
When council rulemaking under the Act results in an ascertaina-
ble and consequential intercircuit inequality of procedural rights, a per-
ception of unfairness is likely to arise from the differential treatment. 9 '
The answer to disuniformity, however, is not to require the greatest
level of procedural protection that councils transfixed by the model of
adversary court proceedings have seen fit to afford. It is rather to en-
sure that all councils have in place a rule that provides% sufficient pre-
dictability and certainty to satisfy the statutory goals of public account-
ability and judicial independence Without depriving special committees
or the councils of flexibility - the ability to continue to experiment
locally - in investigating complaints. In the case of evidence, the ap-
proach of the First and Third Circuits should be preferred to that of
the Second. 9 '
2. The Merger of Minimalism and Disuniformity
Again, however, actual conflict between council rules is the excep-
tion. Since most of the councils have chosen not to elaborate the skeletal
procedure set forth in the Act, the problems of minimalism and dis-
uniformity merge. The Judicial Conference simply cannot ascertain
from council rules, and it is unlikely to learn from other existing
Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 94.
' First Circuit Rule 14.
... Third Circuit Rules 6(D)(iv), 7(D)(iv). See also Third Circuit Rule 6(D)(iv) reporters'
note.
1,3 See Second Circuit Rules 0.24(c)-(d).
1" Cf. supra text accompanying note 186 (arbitrary rules). This may also be a problem in
connection with the rights afforded to the subject of a complaint before a judicial council that has
received a special committee's report, if the silence of a number of councils' rules signals an intent
to afford rights significantly less protective than those recognized in the rules discussed supra note
155.
19, See supra text accompanying notes 173-74; note 179; f. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 107,
§§ 16:1-:5 (rules of evidence in administrative proceedings).
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sources, the extent to which the procedure followed in most aspects of
processing complaints differs among the circuits. That is reason enough
for the Conference to interpret its powers under the Act broadly. When
considered together with the costs of rulemaking minimalism, as such,
to the Act's goals, the case for active national leadership becomes
compelling.196
C. Inconsistency with the Act
For rules that, viewed as a whole, depart so little from the statu-
tory framework, the councils' efforts include a surprising number of
provisions that conflict with the terms of the Act, are inconsistent with
its animating policies, or exceed its grant of rulemaking authority.
1. Inconsistency with the Act's Provisions
We need not pause over obvious inconsistencies with the language
of the Act that are of little moment, such as the requirement in the
rules of one council that a complaint be filed with the circuit executive
rather than with the clerk of the court of appeals, as specified in the
Act.19 Moreover, we should probably treat as inadvertent the failure to
include in council rules statutory adverbs designed to speed complaint
processing. 98
' See supra note 95 and accompanying text. As a start, the Conference should promulgate
rules for the conduct of its own business under the Act. But the Standing Committee appointed in
1982, see infra note 265, has reported to the Conference as follows:
The committee has adopted no rules. Indeed, it is seriously doubted that this
committee is authorized to adopt rules, for we were authorized only to perform the
adjudicatory function of the Conference. At the present time, however, we see no
necessity for a body of rules. We believe that we are authorized to obtain supple-
mentation of the records when needed and to hold a hearing in any case in which a
hearing woud be appropriate. I can perceive the possible need of a rule regulating
the filing of petitions for reconsideration, but we believe that we need more experi-
ence before suggesting the adoption of any rule.
Report of the Standing Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders
(Sept. 1982) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). The chairman of the
committee has recently reaffirmed the position regarding the need for rules. See letter from Hon.
Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., to Stephen B. Burbank (Apr. 22, 1983) (copy on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review). For the expectation in Congress that the Conference
would promulgate rules, see supra note 109.
'" See Sixth Circuit Rule 2, which also authorizes filing with the clerk's office "[i]n the
absence or unavailability of the Circuit Executive." For the relevant statutory language, see supra
note 4.
S Compare, e.g., Sixth Circuit Rule 4 and Eighth Circuit Rule 3 and First Circuit Rule 5
with 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 5 (the rules omit the adverb
"expeditiously" in connection with review by the chief judge); and id. § 372(c)(4), quoted supra
note 6 (the rules omit the adverb "promptly" in connection with certification of documents to a
special committee). For the influence of borrowing, see supra note 126. For an analysis suggesting
that these omissions may not prove as benign as suggested in the text, see Neisser, supra note 3, at
152, 156. For a rule that makes the statutory requirement precise, see Third Circuit Rule 5(D)
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Council rules that omit or imperfectly reflect other statutory re-
quirements are less easily dismissed. The Act forbids a judge or magis-
trate "whose conduct is the subject of an investigation under this sub-
section" to serve on a special committee, a judicial council, or the
Judicial Conference (or the standing committee authorized by the Act)
"until all related proceedings under this subsection have been finally
terminated."' 199 Some of the councils' rules do not address the matter.200
One of the councils, in addressing it, does not capture the breadth of
the statutory disqualification.20'
It can be argued that disqualification standards are not within the
Act's grant of rulemaking authority. Alternatively, it can be argued that
council rules should not be expected to incorporate all statutory provi-
sions regarding complaint processing, whether or not within the coun-
cils' rulemaking authority. Whatever the merits of those arguments in
the abstract - neither supports the partial treatment that has occurred
in one circuit - if there ever was a case for incorporation of existing
legal prescriptions, even if beyond the power of the rulemakers to for-
mulate, this is it. Incorporation of disqualification standards is desirable
in this instance not only for the usual reason, obviating the need to
resort to multiple sources of law, but, more important, because it serves
Congress's goal of "promot[ing] respect for the principle that the ap-
pearance of justice is an integral element of this country's justice
system.
202
2. Inconsistency with the Act's Policies
Apart from inconsistency with the terms of the Act, a number of
council rules appear to be inconsistent with its underlying policies.
The fact that the Act provides one mechanism for processing com-
plaints against federal judges and magistrates does not logically require
the view that it excludes all other means of self-regulation. Indeed, an
(requiring certification of documents within 5 days of appointment of special committee).
" 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(12) (Supp. V 1981). For an interpretation of the statutory disqualifi-
cation, see supra note 169 and accompanying text.
I" See the rules of the Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits. For thi influence of borrowing, see
supra note 126.
201 See First Circuit Rule 9 ("Judges who are subjects of the complaint shall not be eligible
to vote."). Of course, neither here nor elsewhere is there reason for council rules to include statu-
tory requirements applicable to the Judicial Conference. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 241-42
(inappropriateness of council rules prescribing time limits on petitions for review to the Judicial
Conference).
302 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 1, quoted in part, supra note 14. On the incorporation
principle, see Burbank, supra note 86, at 1147-57. For disqualification rules going beyond those
required by the Act, see Third Circuit Rules 9(H) & 10(G).
For other material omissions in council rules, see supra note 153. See also supra note 154.
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interesting question arises concerning the residual powers of the coun-
cils to deal with such problems.2 '3 Whatever the answer to that ques-
tion, the provision in one council's rules authorizing a chief district
judge to receive a complaint and to "take such action as is appropriate"
is very difficult to support.20 4 Passing the problem that authority for
such a rule must be found outside the Act, 05 the rule itself disregards
203 See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 8-9. The
House report may be thought to suggest broad power in the councils to deal on their own motion
with matters that could also properly be grounds for a complaint under the Act. See also Third
Circuit Rule 2(B) reporters' note ("the procedures set forth in these Rules do not affect other
powers of the Judicial Council, including the power to hold hearings, to take sworn testimony,
and to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum under 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)"). Moreover, the
Act contemplates that a council will acquire information suggesting the need for disciplinary ac-
tion in ways other than consideration and investigation of a complaint. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c)(7)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
On the other hand, although the universe of those who may file a complaint ("any person")
includes the Chief Judge and other members of a council, sua sponte investigations outside the
complaint mechanism established by the Act are problematical. S. 1873 authorized the councils to
investigate allegations on their own motion, but it contemplated such investigations with a view to
filing a complaint "if appropriate." S. 1873, supra note 1 (proposing amendment adding 28
U.S.C. § 372(c)(4)), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 312-13; see SENATE REPORT,
supra note 60, at 8.
In distinguishing between situations in which a council may act under § 332(d) and those in
which it must act, if at all, under § 372(c), one can rely on a distinction between judicial adminis-
tration and judicial discipline only by ignoring the argument that the Act's discipline mechanism
is, in fact, designed primarily to serve the goals of judicial administration. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 70-74; 94-96. Moreover, resort to § 332(d) could lead to an evasion of the Act's
procedural protections and the "excesses" that prompted Congress to embrace them. See supra
note 96 and accompanying text; e. Neisser, supra note 3, at 157-58 (28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(7)(B)). A
test focusing on remedial action is unsatisfactory, if only because the sanctions enumerated in
§ 372(c)(6) are not exclusive.
Dangers of another sort would be implicated if a council's powers under § 332(d)(1) were
invoked at the behest of a judge initiating "an investigation into his own conduct where, for exam-
ple, he ha[d] been accused of improper conduct by a reporter," House Hearings, supra note 24, at
70, as proposed in the Third Circuit before the Act was passed. See id. Among them, public
accountability would not be well served by an investigation conducted without a complainant al-
leging a real grievance and without any provision for outside monitoring.
Apart from other modes of self-regulation, conduct with which the Act is concerned may be
made the subject of a complaint to law enforcement authorities or to the House of Representatives.
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13.
"0" (i) Nothing in this rule precludes a person from filing in the first instance a com-
plaint with respect to a district judge or magistrate with the chief judge of the
district court involved, or a complaint with respect to a bankruptcy judge with the
most senior bankruptcy judge of the court involved, in which event the chief judge
of the district court or most senior judge of the bankruptcy court to which the com-
plaint is addressed may take such action as is appropriate. Any judicial officer ag-
grieved by such action may petition the chief judge of the circuit in writing for a
review thereof under section (b) of this rule. A complainant dissatisfied with the
disposition of a complaint may subsequently initiate the procedures provided for by
this rule.
Second Circuit Rule 0.24(i). Rule 0.24(b) implements 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981),
quoted supra note 5. This Article does not address that part of the rule that relates to bankruptcy
judges.
203 See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 11. The Second Circuit
Rule cannot fairly be said to concern "the conduct of proceedings under this subsection." More-
over, against the argument that it merely preserves power found elsewhere, note that such power
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the statute's background and legislative history in at least three re-
spects. First, it derogates from Congress's purpose to provide an au-
thoritative and efficient mechanism for processing formal complaints. 20 6
Second, it makes more difficult the attainment of Congress's goal of
public accountability and the means chosen to achieve that goal, includ-
ing publicity and oversight.207 Third, it may be seen as a threat to judi-
cial independence not contemplated by Congress.20 8 All of this is not to
say that chief district judges have no role to play in resolving problems
of alleged misconduct or disability.209 Formally to assert by rule power
that is doubtful,210 to authorize a competing mechanism that is proce-
dure-less and the operations and results of which are totally insulated
from public scrutiny, and to sanction another layer of regulation for
federal judges is, however, to fail to heed the lessons of the Act's his-
tory. One of those lessons is not to confuse influence with power.
is doubtful, see infra note 210, and that the rule purports to authorize a chief district judge to
"take such action as is appropriate."
2' See supra text accompanying notes 14, 76 & 83-84; notes 85 & 175. The Second Circuit
Rule discussed supra note 204 does contemplate that a complaint may end up being processed as
provided in the Act. But it adds another layer to that process.
SOS See supra text accompanying notes 100 & 106.
08 See supra text accompanying notes 87-91; supra note 206: Compared with Second Circuit
Rule 0.24(i), Ninth Circuit Rule 2, requiring that a copy of a complaint against a district judge or
magistrate be transmitted to the "chief judge of the district concerned," is a small point at which to
stick. But see Third Circuit Rule 3(B) reporters' note:
Although there may in an appropriate case be occasion for consultation by the
Chief Judge with the chief judge of the district concerned, a uniform notice require-
ment does not seem necessary and may not be desirable in light of concerns ex-
pressed, during the formulation of the Act, about the independence of individual
federal judges.
2- See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1981). Wheeler and Levin are correct in
asserting:
U]udicial discipline mechanisms must harness and preserve the best qualities of
informal methods of dealing with problem judges. Formal mechanisms with triggers
so sensitive as to preclude the operation of these informal devices will drain the
system's total capacity to achieve effective judicial discipline. Particularly when for-
mal mechanisms cast a judge and his colleagues in an adversary role, with the pro-
cedural corallaries [sic] that implies, they serve to abort informal processes that
could have been more effective and less burdensome to the system itself. In short,
the effective administration of the judicial system should continue to benefit
from - and place reliance in - the capacities of individual judges to alert col-
leagues to problems of their behavior, or of their physical or mental condition, that
must be dealt with, although often by measures less drastic than retirement or
resignation.
WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 74, reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 694; see
also 126 CONG. REC. S13,859-60 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
But Second Circuit Rule 0.24(i) purports to establish a formal mechanism in addition to that
prescribed in the Act and to confer power on chief district judges.
210 It is difficult to imagine a plausible argument that chief district judges have inherent
power in this area. Moreover, a list of "U.S. Code Sections Affecting Chief District Judges"
furnished to the author by the Federal Judicial Center reveals no such authority in existing statu-
tory law. A copy of the list, which was prepared in connection with an ongoing project .of the
Center and may be revised, is on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
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Other council rules present closer questions of consistency with the
Act's policies. 1' For example, the rules of two councils authorize such
restrictions on disclosure as the councils deem appropriate in providing
written notice to a complainant of council action in a matter upon
which a special committee has made a report.2"' These same councils'
rules also authorize withholding the name of the judge involved in the
written order of such action required to be made available to the public
by the Act.21 '
The Act must be read to permit the anonymity of a judge or mag-
istrate when the council's action is a censure or reprimand "by means
of private communication," '214 and in such circumstances it may be rea-
sonable for a council to attempt to ensure, although it is not clear that
it has the power to enforce, confidentiality on the part of the complain-
ant.215 With that exception, required to reconcile conflicting provisions
resulting from a Senate amendment to the House bill, these council
rules may conflict with the purpose of that amendment. Identifying a
judge or magistrate would not be necessary if the amendment's only
purpose was, as it may have been, to provide "public access to the pro-
cess created by this legislation. '"2 ' But identification would seem to be
important if public accountability, like judicial independence, is thought
to have both institutional and individual aspects.217 Moreover, argu-
"I In addition to the rules discussed in the text, see, e.g., Second Circuit Rule 0.24(b) (au-
thorizing chief judge to refer complaint to screening panel consisting of one circuit judge and one
district judge for review and recommendation); Eleventh Circuit Rule 3(c) (same); Eighth Circuit
Rule 3 (authorizing chief judge to conduct "preliminary investigation"). The Act does not em-
power a chief judge or his delegate to conduct an investigation, preliminary or otherwise, except
for the purpose of performing his limited role under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3) (Supp. V 1981). See
Third Circuit Rule 4(B) reporters' note; supra note 169.
22 See Ninth Circuit Rule 6(C); Fourth Circuit Rule 6(C). The Act requires a council
"immediately [to] provide written notice to the complainant and to such judge or magistrate of the
action taken under this paragraph." 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(C) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note
7.
213 See Ninth Circuit Rule 6(D); Fourth Circuit Rule 6(D). For the Act's publicity require-
ments, see 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(15) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 104. For the Act's confiden-
tiality requirements, see id. § 372(c)(14), quoted supra note 103.
214 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B)(v) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 7; see Third Circuit
Rule 7(G); Third Circuit Rule 7(G) reporters' note ("[The Rule] tracks 28 U.S.C. §372(c)(15),
accommodating the evident inconsistency between that section ... and ... §372(c)(6)(B)(v), pro-
viding for censure or reprimand by 'private communication.' "); see also Neisser, supra note 3, at
158-59.
2, But cf SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 16 (suggesting that one who violated the confi-
dentiality provisions of S. 1873, supra note 1, could be found in contempt); Third Circuit Rule
6(F) (providing for transmittal of copy of special committee's report to complainant and subject of
complaint under confidentiality order); supra note 146.
216 126 CONG. REC. S13,861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at
H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); see also id. at S13,860 (Senate
amendments require "the procedures and institutions involved to be more open to public scru-
tiny"); id. at H10,191 (same); House Hearings, supra note 24, at 174 (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
217 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 5.
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ments for confidentiality as a means to induce acquiescence by the sub-
ject of a complaint, particularly in disability cases, are weakened by the
statutory provision permitting a council's order to omit reasons when
the interests of justice so require.21 But the legislative history is hardly
decisive. Given this uncertainty about Congress's purpose and the force
of an argument for individual public accountability, the asserted power
to withhold the name of the subject- of an investigation and to impose
restrictions on disclosure should be exercised only in the exceptional
case.
The rules of two councils deal with the question of attorney's fees.
The Judicial Council of the District of Columbia Circuit has deter-
In this context, informal systems, such as the largely behind-the-scenes activities in
the federal courts, can have two major problems. First, would-be complainants have
no knowledge of how and where to express their grievances. Second, while the pub-
lic may have a general feeling that there are problems on the bench, it normally has
little knowledge that specific problems have been identified and dealt with. In other
words, the barrier to public satisfaction is not in the actions taken but in the lack of
communication about those actions. The defects can be remedied, albeit within lim-
its. For example, the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended in
March, 1979 that each of the circuits consider the "promulgation of rules of proce-
dure for the receipt and processing of complaints against judges." Such promulga-
tion is unlikely to accomplish the whole task. It is not to be expected that the public
can be easily educated to the causes of dissatisfaction that should be immune from
discipline - e.g., unpopular decisions - and the areas properly in the cognizance
of judicial discipline. Explaining why judges were not disciplined, however, pre-
sumably would serve an educational role.
WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 68 (footnote omitted), reprinted in House Hearings, supra
note 24, at 688.
We are not here concerned with a judge's interest or the "public interest in avoiding publicity
for unfounded charges." Id. at 62, reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 24, at 682; see also
supra notes 166 & 169.
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(15) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 104. It is unclear why
this provision was deemed necessary if it was contemplated that the name of a judge could be
withheld. It may have been feared that in a rare case disciosure of reasons could prejudice an
ongoing criminal investigation, a possibility even if the subject of the complaint were not identified.
But, whatever Congress's purpose in adding this provision, it would appear largely to meet argu-
ments like those suggested in the text. For an elaboration of those arguments, see House Hearings,
supra note 24, at 167-68 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Rosenberg). Note in that re-
gard that S. 1873, supra note 1, upon which Mr. Rosenberg was commenting, provided for confi-
dentiality unless disclosure was authorized in writing by the subject of a complaint, unless the
judge was censured or reprimanded by means of public announcement, or unless "final adverse
action" was taken against him. S. 1873 (proposing amendment adding § 372(n)), reprinted in
House Hearings, supra note 24, at 322-23.
The Act's public availability provision presents other serious interpretive problems. See Neis-
ser, supra note 3, at 158-59. The suggestion that the statutory requirement of public availability
may be limited by distinguishing statutorily enumerated "actions" from statutorily enumerated
"orders," see id., would seem to founder on discontinuities between the dichotomy effected thereby
and the dichotomy suggested by the Senate and House managers' references to "sanctioning ac-
tion[s]." See 128 CONG. REC. S13,861 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini);
id. at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). In context, both refer-
ences seem to contemplate that all actions under § 372(c)(6)(B) will be implemented by order.
But c. § 372(c)(10) (referring to "a final order of the chief judge" but also to "an action of the
judicial council under paragraph 6 of this subsection").
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mined that the subject of an investigation "shall receive payment of
attorney's fees in accordance with procedures established by the Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts" and would
permit an "investigating panel," in its discretion, to authorize a com-
plainant appearing before it "to request payment of attorney's fees"
from the Director. 1 ' The Judicial Council of the Third Circuit pro-
vides that "[a] Special Committee or the Judicial Council, as the case
may be, shall have the discretion to authorize the payment of attorney's
fees for a complainant or for a judge or magistrate whose conduct is the
subject of a complaint.)
220
The Act does not specifically treat the issue of attorney's fees, and
the legislative history is not helpful. The strongest support for the
power to pay such fees comes from a statement in the Congressional
Budget Office Cost Estimate that is part of the House report.221 To
extrapolate, however, from this statement to congressional purpose re-
quires quite a leap, particularly when one notes that the statutory pro-
vision directing the Director of the Administrative Office to pay "out of
funds appropriated for the operation and maintenance of the courts"
refers to "necessary expenses incurred by the judicial councils of the
circuits and the Judicial Conference under section 372 of this title, in-
cluding mileage allowance and witness fees."'222 To argue that attor-
ney's fees are "necessary expenses" as a general proposition is a boot-
strap operation. The inference of congressional purpose becomes even
more attenuated when it is recalled that S. 1423, the Nunn/DeConcini
bill passed by the Senate in the Ninety-Fifth Congress, provided reim-
bursement of attorney's fees for a judge or Justice who was the subject
of a complaint only if that complaint was "finally dismissed.
'223
19 D.C. Circuit Rules 5(C), 5(E). The difference between the two rules makes clear that the
Judicial Council of the D.C. Circuit has made a categorical judgment that the subject of a com-
plaint is entitled to attorney's fees in every case and that the only function of the Administrative
Office is to prescribe procedures for payment.
22 Third Circuit Rule 10(H).
221 "Based on information from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, it is also ex-
pected that the government will provide the judge assistance by counsel, resulting in estimated
costs of over $100,000 in the first year." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 22; see also id. at 20
("[TIhe committee agrees with the cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office."); SENATE
REPORT, supra note 60, at 19 (Congressional Budget Office Report).
At the House hearings, Assistant Attorney General Rosenberg urged the subcommittee to
consider "whether, if a complaint relates to a judge's conduct in an official capacity, the judge
should be provided with representation at public expense on the same terms that currently apply
in civil suits against agents of the federal government." House Hearings, supra note 24, at 164.
222 28 U.S.C. § 604(h)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (added by Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 5, 94 Stat.
2035, 2040 (1980)); see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 16; see also SENATE REPORT, supra
note 60, at 17.
23 See S. REP. No. 1035, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1978); S. 295, supra note 35, § 391(d),
reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 154.
A judge or Justice may only receive attorneys' fees under this section if a complaint
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At the most, the Act and its legislative history support the payment
of attorney's fees when "necessary" to the achievement of the Act's pur-
poses and goals, a determination to be made by, or pursuant to stan-
dards approved by, the Director of the Administrative Office. 24 Al-
though that standard does not exclude prospective categorical
judgments, the Nunn/DeConcini bill suggests that whatever judgment
is expressed in the District of Columbia Circuit Council's rule requir-
ing payment of attorney's fees is too broad. The flexible approach re-
flected in that council's discretionary rule and in the rule of the Third
Circuit Council more nearly accords with the admittedly ambiguous
evidence of congressional purpose, and even that approach is subject to
challenge. 25
finally is dismissed. Therefore, if the commission dismisses a complaint but the
court remands the matter for further investigation and the judge ultimately is cen-
sured, no attorneys' fees are to be provided. The entitlement to attorneys' fees arises
only once the matter ultimately is resolved.
S. REP. No. 1035, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1978).
"' See supra text accompanying note 222; cf. the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 116(a), 96 Stat. 25, 32:
Whenever a Chief Justice, justice, judge, officer, or employee of any United States
court is sued in his official capacity, or is otherwise required to defend acts taken or
omissions made in his official capacity, and the services of an attorney for the gov-
ernment are not reasonably available pursuant to chapter 31 of this title, the Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts may pay the costs of his
defense. The Director shall prescribe regulations for such payments subject to the
approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
This provision contemplates litigation, not an "inquisitorial-administrative" proceeding such as
that contemplated by the Act, a fact that the reference to chapter 31 of title 28 makes clear. See 28
U.S.C. § 516 (1976); S. REP. NO. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1981); Regulations of the
Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Governing the Retention of Private
Counsel to Represent Judges of the United States and Court Employees Sued in their Official
Capacities § 1.2 (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) ("sued . . . or
. . . otherwise required to defend in litigation."); see also id. § 2.5 (mandamus). These regula-
tions were approved by the judicial Conference. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States 76 (Sept. 1982). Nonetheless, the provision suggests an appropriate
means of dealing with requests for attorney's fees under the Act until such time as there is statu-
tory clarification. In that regard, the Director's regulations provide standards and procedures gov-
erning both requests for legal representation and compensation of private counsel.
Finally, Third Circuit Rule 10(H) can, but need not, be read to arrogate final decision on
payment - subject always to the availability of funds - to the council. The preferable reading,
however, is that the rule, like D.C. Circuit Rule 5(E), provides for first-level approval, subject to
final action by the Director.
21 See supra note 223. Although the contexts are quite different, it is interesting to note that
the proponents of the bill, eventually passed as the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, giving the Su-
preme Court of the United States supervisory rulemaking power in civil actions at law may have
believed that such matters as costs and fees were beyond the power conferred by that bill. See S.
REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong. 1st Sess. 10-11 (1926); Burbank, supra note 86, at 1084 n.297. The
original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules was of the same view with respect to the amount of,
and items taxable as, costs. See letter from William D. Mitchell to Charles E. Clark (Oct. 13,
1937) (Charles E. Clark Papers, Yale University Library, box 111, folder 58); Burbank, supra
note 86, at 1137 n.541.
An inference of lack of authority under S. 1423, see supra note 223, may be warranted by
the placement of the provision regarding attorneys' fees in a section (§ 391) conferring rulemaking
19821
338 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:283
3. Ultra Vires
Finally, a few of the rules promulgated by the councils exceed the
authority conferred by the Act or present problems of authority that
deserve attention.226
The Act's rulemaking grant extends to "rules for the conduct of
proceedings under this subsection, including the processing of petitions
for review. 221 Congress contemplated rules "establishing procedures
for the filing of complaints . . . and for the investigation and resolution
of such complaints. '228 Neither the language Congress employed, nor
the Act's legislative history, nor the history of other rulemaking grants
to the federal judiciary supports the notion that, under this grant, the
councils have the power to make rules of substantive law, as for in-
stance by elaborating the statutory standards of misconduct or disabil-
ity.22 '9 That task remains with Congress, through amendments to the
Act, or with the councils and the Conference through the resolution of
individual complaints. Moreover, an analysis of and experience under
other rulemaking grants suggests considerable doubt that it was Con-
gress's purpose to confer power on the councils to make rules having
what might be called predictable and identifiable substantive side
effects.
230
authority. Alternatively, the purpose may have been to foreclose any other rulemaking choices. A
rule like that of the Third Circuit, supra text accompanying note 220, makes no choices and
therefore may be less vulnerable to challenge from the perspective of rulemaking authority. Cf
Burbank, supra note 86, at 1184, 1193 (Rules Enabling Act of 1934). It may still, however, be
invalid if, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the councils are found to lack the power ever
(that is, even on a case-by-case basis) to authorize reimbursement of attorneys' fees.
"' In addition to the rules discussed in the text, see supra notes 188 & 205 and accompany-
ing text.
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1 1) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 11.
223 Id. at § 372(c)(17) (rules for specialized courts).
"' See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13-14; id. at 4; supra text accompanying
notes 92-95; c£ Burbank, supra note 86, at 1121-25 (Rules Enabling Act of 1934). Congress
contemplated the "building of precedents" by the Judicial Conference, exercising its power to
grant petitions for review. See 126 CONG. RE. S13,858 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini).
That is not to say, of course, that Congress could not have conferred such power on the
councils, if, that is, they are not thought to be acting as article III courts in performing the tasks
assigned by the Act. Unfortunately, there is a mystifying (and obviously misplaced) footnote in the
House report suggesting that the councils exercise judicial power. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note
14, at 15 n.35. But see, e.g., id. at 14; Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 58 (statement of Chief
Judge Browning). Rather, in granting authority to promulgate "rules for the conduct of proceed-
ings," Congress has not made such a delegation. Cf Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 507
F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[A] matter 'relating to pr~ctie or procedure' means technical
regulation of the form of agency action and proceedings . . .[and] does not include formalized
criteria adopted by an agency to determine whether claims for relief are meritorious.").
13 See Burbank, supra note 86, at 1127-29 (Rules Enabling Act of 1934); Wright, Proce-
dural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REV. 563, 569-71 (1967) (limitations on
procedural reform).
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In this light, the Fifth Circuit Council's rule requiring that a com-
plaint "be filed within one year of the action complained of" '' is of
doubtful validity. Rules limiting the time within which a complaint
may be filed are examples of rules that, although possessed of a proce-
dural aspect, are nevertheless so intertwined with the substantive law as
to fall outside of a rulemaking grant that seeks to allocate power by
reference to a dichotomy, however imprecise, between procedure and
substance.2 2 For that reason, even under the Rules Enabling Act of
1934,2"' a rulemaking grant that has been aggrandized and obscured,
the Supreme Court has been alert to the far less consequential limita-
tions implications of a provision of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.234
A chief judge and the council of a circuit may have the power to
dismiss an individual complaint as untimely by reference to considera-
tions captured in the equitable doctrine of laches, applied to the facts in
the light of Congress's purpose to secure the efficient and expeditious
resolution of complaints.2 5 But that is not the regime suggested by the
Fifth Circuit's rule. If, as may well be, the policies typically animating
a statute of limitations are thought to have particular force in this con-
text, suggesting that at some point the need for certainty and predict-
ability is greater than the need to ensure public accountability, Con-
gress should amend the Act.2 8
Given this analysis of a rule limiting the period within which com-
plaints may be filed, the question arises whether the far more 'numer-
ous council rules limiting the time for filing petitions for review from
the action of a chief judge can be sustained.2 3 Notwithstanding at-
tempts to justify similar rules in other contexts by reference to the fact
of an "already existing action, 233 one must scratch the surface some-
231 Fifth Circuit Rule 24.1.
21 See Burbank, supra note 86, at 1128.
3~ 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
' See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (FED. R. Civ.
P. 3); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (same); Burbank, supra note 86, at
1131-84, 1158-60.
2 Cf Neisser, supra note 3, at 160 (petitions for review).
M The concern that a judicial discipline mechanism might be used to harass federal judges, a
concern implicating judicial independence, suggests the wisdom of a limitations period. Cf supra
note 76 and accompanying text (speedy dismissal of frivolous complaints). But particularly be-
cause public accountability is so poorly served by a prospective rule fashioned by judges, the choice
should be made by Congress. Moreover, claims of both misconduct and disability might well be
predicated on a course of action (or inaction) the consideration of which should not be foreclosed
by the deadline chosen, unless it is a long one.
" These rules are considered from a different perspective supra text accompanying notes
183-86.
Kaplan, Amendments of the Fedeial Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-63 (pt. 2), 77 HARV.
L. REV. 801, 810 (1964). But see Burbank, supra note 86, at 1156 fi.607.
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what harder for relevant distinctions. It would help if council rules in-
cluded a provision making explicit a power to enlarge limitations peri-
ods.2"' In any event, a relevant distinction does subsist in the differing
probabilities of notice of such a period on the part of an actual com-
plainant seeking review of the order of a chief judge as compared with
a putative complainant who has not been alerted to the possibility that
rights under the Act may be cut off by "procedural" rules.240
A similar problem arises with respect to time limits imposed by
some councils on petitions for review to the Judicial Conference from
council action.2 1 But here one need not pause over nice distinctions.
The councils have no business making rules governing petitions for re-
view to the Judicial Conference. 2
D. Public Accountability
Implicated in many aspects of procedure under the Act,2 " the goal
of assuring public accountability is not restricted to the process of
resolving complaints. In response to widespread criticism of, and con-
gressional interest in, court rulemaking, it has been observed that the
public has little constructive to offer in the formulation of procedural
rules.2 Whether or not that contention is true, consultation in the de-
velopment of procedural rules to implement a statute that avowedly re-
spects appearances more than reality245 cannot be dismissed as a futile
3 Cf FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5) (authorizing a district court, "upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause," to "extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a)."); Burbank, supra note
86, at 1156 n.607 (Rules Enabling Act of 1934).
o Cf Burbank, supra note 86, at 1156 n.607, 1170 n.666 (Rules Enabling Act of 1934).
But see Neisser, supra note 3, at 160. Third Circuit Rule 2(B) requires that all complaints "be
filed on forms provided, together with a copy of these Rules, through the office of the clerk of the
Court of Appeals." In addition, the rules require specific notice of rights to the complainant and
the subject of the complaint. See Third Circuit Rules 4(D), 5(E), 7(B)(iii); Third Circuit Rule
4(D) reporters' note.
41 See Ninth Circuit Rule 8; Second Circuit Rule 0.24(e); Fourth Circuit Rule 8; Eleventh
Circuit Rule 8.
141 The Judicial Conference has the power to prescribe rules, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11) (Supp.
V 1981), quoted supra note 11, and Congress expected that it would exercise that power. See
supra note 109. An argument by analogy to former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(a), abro-
gated by the Supreme Court's Order Prescribing the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 389
U.S. 1065, 1065-66 (1967), fails because both involved an exercise of supervisory rulemaking
power by the Supreme Court, predicated in part on a need for uniformity.
Third Circuit Rule 7(B)(iii) requires the Judicial Council to include with its order "notice of
any right to petition the Judicial Conference for review under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10)."
'"s See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 140-47, 157-58 & 164-67; see also supra text
accompanying notes 183-90, 202, 207, 211-18 & 236.
244 See Hazard, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1290-92 (1978).
"" In a very real sense the problem addressed in the Act is more one of perception
than actuality - the need to assure the public that procedures are in place to deal
with the rare instance justifying an inquiry related to the condition or conduct of a
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or cynical gesture. For the same reason, and as a measure of protection
against a flood of misdirected complaints, one could hope for efforts to
bring the existence of the Act and council rules (or council procedure
more generally) to the attention of the public that go beyond the mini-
mum required by Congress. 4 Finally, in light of explicit indications of
abiding congressional concern,2 47 self-interest would also suggest the
wisdom of candor in providing the information necessary to evaluate
this experiment in judicial self-regulation.
1. Rulemaking Process
Of the eleven councils that have revised their rules to implement
the Act, only three solicited public comment on drafts of such rules.2 "
Moreover, notwithstanding the clear prospect of congressional action to
ensure extra-judicial participation in the rulemaking process in closely
allied areas,249 only three of the councils submitted drafts of their rules
to advisory committees. 50 Indeed, six of the councils did not even seek
the comments of all federal judges in the circuit, and seven did not
include bankruptcy judges and magistrates in the group consulted.25'
These statistics tend to confirm the suggestion that one purpose of
many councils was to have a set of rules, any set of rules, in place when
the Act became effective.2 52 They are cause for concern not only from
the perspective of public accountability. Many of those who will be the
subjects of complaints were denied the opportunity even to offer their
member of the judiciary. Stated another way, the growing public demand for the
accountability of public officials should extend to the judicial branch.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 60, at 5; see also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 4, 19-20.
246 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(11) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 11, requires that "[alny rule
promulgated under this subsection. . . be a matter of public record." See HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 14, at 14. For the role that increased publicity could play in reducing the number of com-
plaints, see infra text accompanying note 258. As to council procedure more generally, see
§ 372(c)(15), quoted supra note 104; supra note 147 and accompanying text; infra note 258.
24 See supra text accompanying notes 16 & 100-06.
"' Responses to questionnaire, supra note 121. In one case, the public notice and request for
comment went only to bar associations. In the other two cases, the notice was much more broadly
disseminated, including by a press release. The Tenth Circuit is not included in this calculation.
See supra text accompanying note 18; note 123.
24, See the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 208, 96 Stat.
25, 54-55: "(b) Each court of appeals shall appoint an advisory committee for the study of the
rules of practice and internal operating procedures of the court of appeals. The advisory committee
shall make recommendations to the court concerning such rules and procedures." Although not
enacted until 1982, this provision was part of S. 1477, supra note 1, with the contents and history
of which the federal judiciary had good reason to be conversant both generally and as it bore on
judicial councils. See supra note 1.
1 Responses to questionnaire, supra note 121.
Responses to questionnaire, supra note 121.
See supra text accompanying note 121.
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views on the shape of council rules.25
2. Publicity
Three councils provided no public notice of the adoption of final
rules to implement the Act.'" In others, the notice was so restricted as
to be unlikely to reach a substantial portion of the bar or the public.
2 55
It is, of course, true that the Act requires only that council rules be "a
matter of public record.12 56 And it is probably the case that anyone
determined to make a complaint will ultimately be directed to the ap-
propriate clerk's office. Further, the morale of the federal judiciary is a
legitimate concern, and a flood of misdirected complaints could hardly
improve it. But public awareness of the statutory mechanism was Con-
gress's goal. Quite apart from the statutory goal, a less defensive pos-
ture by the councils might reduce the number of clearly improper com-
plaints. The experience to date suggests that complainants have not yet
heard the message that the Act does not provide a substitute for appeal
from a decision or procedural ruling.257 Undoubtedly, some will be im-
mune to that message. But others might be dissuaded from filing if the
' In its 1974 statement of "Powers, Functions and Duties of Circuit Councils," see supra
note 37, the Conference took the position that "[b]efore the circuit council adopts any general
order affecting the operation of the courts within its circuit, the judges of the district courts should
be afforded an opportunity to comment. In appropriate cases it will also be desirable to afford an
opportunity for comment to the bar and public groups known to be concerned." Report of the
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 9 (Mar. 1974).
I Responses to questionnaires, supra note 121. In all three, there was also no public notice
of, or an invitation to comment on, a draft. As a result, in these circuits at least, it remains true
that "the existence of the remedy. . . for dealing with improper judicial conduct, through judicial
councils of the circuits, is not well known . . . to the public." House Hearings, supra note 24, at
85 (statement of Chief Judge Browning).
The March 1979 resolution of the Judicial Conference advised that council rules "should be
announced in such manner as to assure that the public and the bar will be informed." Report of
the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 5 (Mar. 1979); see also FLANDERS
& MCDERMOTT, supra note 39, at 34; WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 68, quoted supra
note 217.
255 Responses to questionnaire, supra note 121. In one circuit, a copy of the rules was sent to
all attorneys admitted to practice. In others, notice was published in legal newspapers, an an-
nouncement was made at the circuit judicial conference, or the like. It does not appear that all of
the councils' rules have been published in sources widely available. See supra note 18.
The notion that all or most complainants will be attorneys or that they will be represented by
attorneys is dubious. The former can be tested empirically. See infra text accompanying note 266.
A survey of complaint dispositions by state commissions in 1981 indicates that "the vast majority
of complaints are filed by litigants, their friends or relatives, and witnesses. Individual attorneys,
nonlitigating citizens, and commissioners themselves comprise the next most frequent sources of
complaints." JUDICIAL CONDUCT REPORTER, Fall 1982, at 2.
See supra note 246.
The table compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for the nine-
month period October 1, 1981 through June 30, 1982 shows that of 67 complaints dismissed by
chief judges (out of a total filed of 89), 43 made allegations directly related to the merits of a
decision or procedural ruling. See Appendix B. In fact, the number may be higher. See infra text
accompanying note 262.
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limited jurisdiction as well as the existence of the Act were publicized
and if aspiring complainants were individually furnished with a copy of
council rules and a complaint form with instructions.25
3. Data for Oversight
The Act requires the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to "include in his annual report filed with the
Congress under this section a summary of the number of complaints
filed with each judicial council . . . indicating the general nature of
such complaints and the disposition of those complaints in which action
has been taken." '259 To compile that report for the nine-month period
ending June 30, 1982, the Administrative Office developed two forms
for completion by each council, one calling for a summary of informa-
tion with respect to the entire reporting period, to be filed annually,
and the other for information with respect to each complaint filed, to be
filed quarterly.26 On the basis of the completed forms, the Director
included in his report for fiscal year 1982 a table and an explanatory
note. 61
A significant deficiency in the Director's table and in the summary
form is the failure to include in the category of complaints concluded or
dismissed by the chief judges complaints that are subsequently brought
to the councils by petition for review. The result is that the number of
dismissals by chief judges almost surely is artificially deflated.
28 2
A related problem is the inability of a reader of the table or the
summary form to determine with confidence the action taken by a
'" See Third Circuit Rule 2; Eighth Circuit Rule 1. Both councils have adopted complaint
forms with instructions. The forms specifically note the Act's limited jurisdiction. The Eighth
Circuit's form results from an amendment on May 17, 1982.
Another means to give publicity to these matters is publishing orders dismissing complaints.
See supra notes 147 & 166; see also House Hearings, supra note 24, at 98 (statement of Chief
Judge Browning); WHEELER & LEVIN, supra note 30, at 68. This is not a common practice,
however, and it is unlikely to prove effective for prospective complainants who are not, or are not
represented by, attorneys. See supra note 255.
259 28 U.S.C. § 604(h)(2) (Supp. V 1981); see supra text accompanying note 102.
20 See letter from William E. Foley to Hon. Collins J. Seitz (July 1, 1982) (copy on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). Copies of both the summary form (Form A.O.
372A) and the individual form (Form A.O. 372B) are also on file. The completed individual forms
filed with the Administration Office are confidential. See id.
1' See Appendix B.
262 Footnote 12 to the table, infra Appendix B, indicates that the category of "Dismissals"
includes "[d]ismissals affirming a chief judge's final order, or pursuant to petition for review, or
based upon an independent council decision." Thus, it may well be that more than 67 complaints
were dismissed by chief judges because, where a petition for review was taken to a council, that
action was attributed to the council. See supra note 257. Thus the explanatory note to the table
may be misleading in stating: "There were 78 complaints concluded during the nine month period.
All, except 11, were disposed of by chief judges. . . .The remaining 11 were disposed of by
judicial councils." See Appendix B.
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council on petitions for review.2"3 Review petitions should receive dis-
crete attention, as they do, albeit to a limited extent, on the individual
form. 2" Until such time, however, as there are uniform rules governing
petitions for review, it is doubtful that the information provided would
be of much use.26
Neither the table nor the summary form provides any information
with respect to complainants. The individual form does call for such
information, but there may not be enough categories to tell the Admin-
istrative Office much about the people who file complaints.266 In any
111 In connection with dismissals, it is unclear whether the councils have denied a petition for
review from dismissal by the chief judge, granted a petition but affirmed dismissal by the chief
judge, or granted a petition and dismissed where the chief judge concluded the proceeding having
found that appropriate corrective action had been taken (the only action other than dismissal that
can ground a petition for review).
'" The individual form (Form A.O. 372B) contains boxes to check under the heading "Com-
plaint Considered by Judicial Council" labelled as follows: "Referred by Chief Judge - 372(c)(4)
and 372(c)(5)" and "Following Petition for Review - 372(c)(10)." For congressional interest in
petitions for review to the Judicial Conference, see 126 CONG. REC. S13,860-61 (daily ed. Sept.
30, 1980) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at H10,191 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier); see also supra note 85.
' Except in the Third Circuit, the procedures to be followed by, and the powers of, judicial
councils in considering petitions for review are not defined, at least in rules promulgated pursuant
to the Act. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. In such circumstances, it would be difficult
indeed to obtain useful statistical information.
Still another defect in the table is the failure to include any information regarding petitions
for review filed with the Judicial Conference under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(10) (Supp. V 1981),
quoted supra note 9. It was not, however, until after the reporting period that the Conference
determined how to proceed. In July 1982 the Conference's Executive Committee created a stand-
ing committee to review petitions, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. V 1981). See Memo-
randum to all Chief Judges, Circuit Executives and Clerks from William E. Foley (Aug. 25,
1982) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). At the Chief Justice's
direction, all such petitions are to be filed with Mr. Foley at the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. Id. As of April 22, 1983, the Standing Committee had disposed of five
petitions for review. See letter from Hon. Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., to Stephen B. Burbank,
supra note 196. The Committee's orders are public documents on file in the Administrative Office.
In one case (No. 82-372-002) the petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the
petitioner had failed to seek review of a Chief Judge's dismissal by the judicial council of the
circuit. In another case (No. 82-372-001) the Committee reviewed and upheld the dismissal of a
complaint against all active members of the Court of Claims. In the three remaining cases (No.
82-372-003, 004, 006), the Committee reviewed and upheld, or after review on the merits denied a
petition for review of, dismissals that had been upheld by judicial councils. At least in the last
group of cases, the Committee should have dismissed the petitions for want of jurisdiction. See
supra note 166. It appears that, having subsequently "closely examined our jurisdiction to review
affirmations by judicial councils of authorized dismissals of complaints by chief circuit judges,"
letter from Hon. Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., to Stephen B. Burbank, supra note 196, the Com-
mittee will dismiss for want of jurisdiction in future cases. See id.; Report of Standing Committee
to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders (Mar. 1983) (copy on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
For the expectation in Congress that Conference or standing committee orders-would serve as
"precedents," see supra note 85. Query whether they can do so if not widely and regularly
circulated.
"' The individual form (Form A.O. 372B) contains boxes to check under the heading "Com-
plainant" labelled as follows: "Prison Inmate," "Attorney," "Public Official," and "Other." It
might be useful to add, at the least, "Civil Litigant" and "Criminal Defendant or Person under
Criminal Investigation."
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event, if a substantial number of complainants are disgruntled losers in
litigation or prisoners with little else to do but file complaints, the judi-
ciary would be well served by public knowledge of those facts.
The table and the summary form do not speak to the nature of
complaint allegations except in categories that, as applied to alleged
misconduct, are of almost meaningless generality.267 The individual
form calls for more particularized information, which is essential if one
is to begin to monitor the interpretation of the Act's substantive stan-
dard at a critical stage.2 8"
Neither the table nor the summary form provides useful informa-
tion regarding special committee or council investigations, and it is not
clear what information the individual form calls for in that respect.26"
Again, differences among the rules and practices of the councils make
the collection of useful statistical information difficult if not impossible.
=" The table and the summary form (Form A.O. 372A) permit identification of the "Nature
of Allegations" as follows: "Mental Disability," "Physical Disability," "Other Allegations Within
Section 372 Jurisdiction," and "Allegations Not Within Section 372 Jurisdiction." See Appendix
B.
2" For the problems presented by the Act's substantive ambiguity in connection with dis-
missals, see supra text accompanying notes 164-70.
The individual form (Form A.O. 372B) contains boxes to check under the heading "Com-
plaint Allegation" as follows: "Mental Disability," "Physical Disability," "Decisional Delay,"
"Demeanor," "Conflict of Interest," "Prejudice or Bias," and "Other (briefly state gravamen of
the major allegation)." If such information is to be useful in summary, however, there must be a
means to relate it to the grounds upon which complaints are dismissed. Moreover, problems of
multiple complaint allegations, multiple subjects of complaints, and multiple grounds of dismissal
must be addressed. The table reveals 102 complaint allegations against 168 individuals in 89
complaints. See also Table 30 explanatory note, Appendix B. The author has been informed by
the staff of the Administrative Office, which prepared the table, that, where a complaint was
dismissed on multiple grounds, the ground corresponding to the highest numbered footnote in
footnotes 1 to 4 was used.
For one approach to the problem of multiple subjects of complaint, see Instructions to Third
Circuit Complaint Form: "Only the conduct of one judge or magistrate may be challenged in your
complaint. If you seek to challenge the conduct of different judges or magistrates, you must file
separate complaints as to each judge or magistrate." See also Third Circuit Rule 10(A) (joinder),
10(B) (severance).
289 It is, of course, possible to make inferences from both the table and the summary form
(Form A.O. 372A), but one must be careful. Thus, it is virtually certain that action by a judicial
council under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6) (Supp. V 1981), quoted supra note 7, will have been pre-
ceded by a special committee investigation, but see supra note 166, and one can therefore make
that assumption regarding the cases enumerated in connection with footnotes 5 through 11 in the
table and the summary form. See Appendix B. Other cases in which a special committee investiga-
tion has occurred could, however, be lumped with "Dismissals" (footnote 12). See supra notes 262
& 263. Moreover, no inferences can be made regarding council investigations.
The individual form (Form A.O. 372B) provides space for information regarding "Hearings




In light of problems of definition arising from the use of the word "hearings," c. supra note 148
("proceedings"), and the failure to separate special committees and councils, this information is
unlikely to be useful with respect to an individual complaint, let alone for statistical purposes.
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Information on these matters would nevertheless be of interest to one
assessing the operation of the statutory mechanism and in particular its
costs.
70
In sum, neither the categories of information included in the Di-
rector's table nor those collected by the Administrative Office are ade-
quate for a comprehensive assessment of the operation of the Act, now
or in the future. Congress cannot rely on data provided pursuant to the
Act for effective oversight. Congress can, of course, request additional
information. The federal judiciary has misapprehended its best interests
in failing to volunteer, or at least to collect, some of that information.
For the rest, we must await more detailed and uniform council rules.
Indeed, the effect of statistical problems of the sort discussed here on
congressional oversight provides another argument for such rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
Measured against criteria of adequacy of detail, innovativeness,
and consistency with the Act's provisions and policies, the rules
promulgated by the judicial councils of the circuits are, taken as a
whole, deficient. As a result, exercising its negative powers - to pre-
vent disruptive disuniformity and modify rules that are inconsistent
with the Act - may not be the most important, although it is an essen-
tial, role for the Judicial Conference to play. The choice of most of the
judicial councils not to elaborate the statute in detail can be supported
by traditional wisdom. The uncertainty and unpredictability resulting
from the councils' minimalism, however, entail costs beyond those tra-
ditionally associated with nonformalism. 27' They threaten purposes
central to the Act.
Criticism of the councils' rulemaking under the Act should not ob-
scure the fact that federal judges are hard pressed to stay abreast of
strictly judicial business.272 The councils may still be inadequately
staffed to accomplish their tasks.273 Until such time as they-are able to
devote serious attention to prospective procedural lawmaking at the lo-
cal level, the impetus of, and the resources available to, a Conference
initiative may be necessary if the problems described here are to be
addressed. 74 At that, one need not be cynical about motivation to un-
170 See supra notes 155, 157 & 158.
"' See sources cited supra note 129.
'72 See, e.g., Remarks of Chief Justice Burger, The Arthur T. Vanderbilt Dinner (Novem-
ber 18, 1982) (copy on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
173 See 28 U.S.C. § 332(e)-(f) (1976); FLANDERS & MCDERMOTT, supra note 39, at 30-31,
70-71, 194.
"4 An instructive analogy lies in comparing federal supervisory court rulemaking with fed-
eral local court rulemaking. In part, the difference in quality may be attributable to the greater
JUDICIAL CONDUCT
derstand why, particularly in light of the experience under the Act to
date," 5 this Article may be regarded as the luxury of an academic. The
question, however, is whether Congress will acquiesce in the judiciary's
priorities. The alternative to central judicial leadership may be further
action by Congress. 76
Using existing council rules as a "Chinese menu,1 77 the Confer-
ence could fashion a uniform yet flexible procedure that would meet
most of the concerns raised here.278 It is to be hoped, however, that if
investment of time and resources devoted to the formulation of rules at the national level. In part,
it may be attributable to the greater number of people who are consulted about such rules. In
addition, is it inconceivable that federal judges simply are not very good at prospective lawmaking?
If so, that is another argument for broadening the base of those involved in the formulation and
consideration of rules. I am indebted to my colleague, Daniel Segal, for encouraging me to think
the unthinkable. See also supra text accompanying notes 248-53. On federal supervisory court
rulemaking, see W. BROWN, supra note 107; J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 107; Burbank, supra note
86, at 1018-21, 1095. On federal local court rulemaking, see J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 107, at
117-45; Flanders, supra note 108.
175 See supra text accompanying note 15; note 257.
276 Thus far, most councils have not amended their rules, and the amendments that have
been made are of limited extent. See supra notes 163, 187, 190 & 258. Moreover, the earlier
history of council efforts in this area is hardly promising. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note
98. Even on the assumption that the councils' rulemaking minimalism is predicated on a desire to
learn from experience, see supra text accompanying notes 117-19, the question recurs when there
will have been enough experience under the Act to prompt elaborative rulemaking by the councils.
See supra note 147. Most complaints filed to date have been dismissed or concluded by the chief
judges, see supra note 257; that is, they have not reached the stage at which the Act and most
councils' rules cease to provide adequate procedural information. See supra text accompanying
notes 132-38.
Congress was, with good reason, unwilling to await experience under the post-March 1979
rules of the councils, which were perceived to be inadequate. See supra text accompanying notes
15-16 & 58-65. The inadequacies of the councils' rules implementing the Act, albeit less egre-
gious, are nevertheless damaging to the Act's policies and goals. For that reason, Congress is
unlikely to heed pleas for more time. Indeed, it is striking that, even before the Act's effective date,
representatives continued to introduce bills proposing alternatives to the Act's scheme of self-regu-
lation. See H.R. 1658, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Rep. Pease); H.R. 2799, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Rep. Oakar). For a more recent proposal, see H.R. 6942,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (introduced by Rep. Findley).
Of course, whether or not the Conference plays an active supervisory role, it should set its
own house in order. See supra note 196.
On alternative sources of procedural information, see supra text accompanying notes 147,
150, 166 & 258.
177 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 182 (statement of Assistant Attorney General
Rosenberg).
278 See supra text accompanying notes 174 & 195; see also, e.g., Third Circuit Rules 6(D)
(special committee proceedings), 9 (review petitions).
Eminent authority cautions against confusing the number of procedural rules with the ques-
tion whether they are "too detailed in the regulation they provide." Wright, Modern Pleading and
the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912 (1953).
But this cannot be proven by a mere counting of rules, as is shown by the usual
rules on discovery of the modern pleading systems; these systems usually have
twelve such rules, with numerous subsections, spelling out in considerable detail the
kinds of discovery available, even though "it might have been possible or even desir-
able to have provided one single broad rule authorizing all forms of discovery in any
civil action." Yet the effect of all these rules is not to limit the trial court's discretion
or the parties' freedom, but rather to make clear just how great this discretion and
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the Conference were moved to undertake the formulation of uniform
rules, it would take advantage of its greater resources and prestige more
broadly to canvass the range of procedural options available and that,
where appropriate, the Conference would afford choice on those options
to the councils.279
Whether or not the Conference takes a broad view of its mandate
under the Act, its leadership should extend to rulemaking procedures.
The Conference has shown responsiveness to criticisms of the process
by which federal supervisory court rules are formulated and thus has
set further in relief local court rulemaking. 280 In most circuits the pub-
lic has had no chance to affect the content of procedural rules imple-
menting the Act and may not even be aware of its existence. In many,
federal judges not on the council and magistrates have also not been
consulted. If the Conference intends to do more than eliminate unwar-
ranted disuniformity and invalidity from council rules, the public
should have an opportunity to participate in that process. In any event,
the Conference should encourage, and may have the power to require,
the councils to open up their own rulemaking processes - for example,
by publishing their existing rules for public comment.2  This is not the
time to disparage appearances in rulemaking.
2 2
Finally, the Conference should assist the Administrative Office in
ensuring the provision of information that is useful in evaluating expe-
rience under the Act. That such information is not now required by
Congress is beside the point. Public awareness of experience to date
might well be of use to the judiciary. In addition, the information may
soon be requested by Congress, and the inability of the Administrative
Office to comply will ill serve the interests of the judiciary. We are here
not concerned with appearances. Congress and the public have a right
to know whether the Act's experiment in self-regulation is working.
freedom are. Thus, these rules do not offend the criterion suggested above.
Id. at 912-13 (footnote omitted); see also supra note 179.
27' The major constraint in such an enterprise would be the problem of disuniformity arising
from the choice of different alternatives by the councils. That is, the Conference should not permit
choice on such matters as time limitations for filing petitions for review to the council where the
benefits of continuing experimentation do not justify the costs of disuniformity. See supra text
accompanying notes 183-86.
"0 See Burbank, supra note 86, at 1021, 1095; see also supra note 274.
1 See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (Supp. V 1981), quoted in part supra note 11; id. at § 372(c)(11),
quoted supra note 11. Three councils did solicit public comment on draft rules. See supra text
accompanying note 248.
See supra text accompanying notes 243-47.
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The table illustrates the implementation of the Act by each judicial council that revised its
rules after the Act was passed and by the specialized courts. The Tenth Circuit is not included.
The table highlights the major changes in, whether departures from or additions to, the statutory
framework. The purpose of the table is to alert the reader to changes of a material nature. For
further analysis, reference to the rule itself (noted to the left of indicated changes) is recommended.
Relevant statutory provisions are listed in the column entitled "Statutory Provisions."
Minor discrepancies that conceivably could have material consequences have been omitted.
For example, some circuits omit the words "expeditiously" and/or "promptly" from their versions
of the statutory sections. Although omission of this language may be relevant in determining the
timeliness of an action, for the purposes of this table it is not considered material.
The annotation "NC" denotes "no change" from the statutory framework. This could indi-
cate either that a circuit council (or specialized court) has copied the Act verbatim or that, despite
differences in language, no material modification has occurred. In the case of the specialized
courts, some changes were necessary to accommodate differences in structure; such changes are not
considered material.
Annotations only reflect changes. Where, for instance, one change is noted, it should be as-
sumed that in all other respects the council rule tracks the statutory provision.
In two instances, the analysis of council rules includes matters not covered in the Act. See




CBJ Chief Bankruptcy Judge








FRE Federal Rules of Evidence
J Judge whose conduct is the subject of a complaint
JC Judicial Council
M Magistrate whose conduct is the subject of a complaint
NC No Change
NRR No Relevant Rule
PO Presiding Officer
SpC Special Committee within the meaning of (c)(4)
Notes
1 Incorporates provisions of the Act by reference. In the case of the Fifth Circuit, there are only
four stated rules. Fifth Circuit Rule 24.5 provides that "[a]ll other proceedings shall be con-
ducted in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c)."
2 The Chief Judge of the Second Circuit appointed a standing special committee for the first
year of operation of the procedures.
S The extent to which the Act prescribes procedural rights before the Judicial Council, and
hence the extent to which rules contain "major changes in, whether departures from or addi-
tions to, the statutory framework," is unclear. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX B
REPORT OF COMPLAINTS FILED AND ACTION TAKEN
UNDER TITLE 28 U.S.C. 372(c)*
The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (Public Law
96-458) requires that the Director of the A.O. include in the Annual Report a summary of the
number of complaints filed under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 372(c), as amended by the Act, indicat-
ing the general nature of the complaints and the disposition of those complaints. Since the Act
became effective on October 1, 1981, this first report covers the nine month period ended June 30,
1982.
During the nine month period covered by this report, there were 89 complaints filed with
clerks of court. There were 56 allegations of conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the courts; one allegation that a judicial official was unable to discharge all
duties of the office by reason of physical disability; 45 allegations not within Section 372 jurisdic-
tion; and no allegations of mental disability. The 89 complaints included allegations against 51
courts of appeals judges, 75 district court judges, 8 national court judges, 9 bankruptcy judges, 11
magistrates, and 14 others. The number of allegations and number of officials involved exceed the
number of complaints because some complaints contain more than one allegation and name more
than one judicial official.
There were 78 complaints concluded during the nine month period. All, except 11, were
disposed of by chief judges as not in conformity with filing requirements under Title 28 U.S.C.
Section 372(c)(1), directly related to the merits of a decision, frivolous, or because the chief judge
found that appropriate action had already been taken. The remaining 11 were disposed of under
Title 28 U.S.C. Section 372(c)(6)(B)(iii), requesting voluntary retirement. There were no referrals
to the Judicial Conference.
There were 11 complaints pending at the end of the year. Seven involved allegations against
district judges, two against bankruptcy judges and two against magistrates.
Table 30 contains a summary of the complaints filed, disposed of, and pending for each
circuit and each of the national courts.
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C.C.P.A. - Court of Custon and Patent Appeals
C.C. - Court of ClaIm
CJ.T. - Court of lntrnational Trade
it" See folloioe page fr explanation of complaints concluded.
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Footnotes for Table 30
1 Not in conformity with requirements of Title 28 U.S.C.
372(cXl): a brief written statement filed with clerk of court of
appeals alleging conduct prejudicial to the effective and expedi-
tious administration of the business of the courts, or alleging
inability to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental
or physical disability.
2 Directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling.
3 Frivolous.
4 Appropriate corrective action has been taken.
5 Directing the chief judge of the district to take appropriate
action with regard to a magistrate who is the subject of a com-
plaint.
6 Certifying disability of an Article III judge.
7 Requesting the voluntary retirement of an Article Ell judge, with
the provision that the length of service requirements under Title
28 U.S.C. Section 371 shall not apply.
8 Ordering that no further cases be assigned for a temporary or
time-certain period.
9 Censuring or reprimanding by means of private communication.
10 Censuring or reprimanding by means of public announcement.
11 Ordering such other action as is deemed appropriate to assure the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts within the circuit, but not dismissals.
12 Dismissals affirming a chief judge's final order, or pursuant to
petition for review, or based upon an independent council deci-
sion.
13 Discretionary referral to the Judicial Conference.
14 Mandatory referral to the Judicial Conference upon a finding that
an Article Ill judge has engaged in conduct that might constitute
a ground for impeachment.
15 Mandatory referral to the Judicial Conference upon a finding that
an Article III judge has engaged in conduct which is not amenable
to resolution by the Judicial Council.
